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Habeas as Forum Allocation:                    
A New Synthesis 
CARLOS M. VÁZQUEZ*  
The scope of habeas relief for state prisoners, especially 
during the decades before the Supreme Court’s 1953 deci-
sion in Brown v. Allen, is a famously disputed question—one 
of recognized significance for contemporary debates about 
the proper scope of habeas review. This Article provides a 
new answer. It argues that, until the enactment of Anti-Ter-
rorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), 
it was broadly accepted that state prisoners were entitled to 
plenary federal review of the legal and mixed law/fact ques-
tions decided against them by state courts. Until 1916, such 
review was provided by the Supreme Court; after 1953, such 
review was provided by the lower federal courts via habeas. 
The situation between 1916 and 1953 was murkier. This Ar-
ticle shows that this was a transitional period marked by dis-
agreement among the Justices as to the appropriate federal 
forum to review state court decisions resulting in custody. At 
the beginning of this period, a majority of Justices continued 
to insist that the responsibility rested with Supreme Court. 
Towards the end of this period, the Court shifted this respon-
sibility to the habeas courts as a majority of Justices came 
to recognize that the Court could no longer hope to monitor 
state court criminal convictions. The Justices during this pe-
riod agreed that federal review of state court convictions 
                                                                                                             
       * Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. I am grateful for 
helpful comments from Ruthanne Deutsch, Stephen Goldblatt, Tara Leigh Grove, 
Vicki Jackson, Victoria Nourse, Michael Seidman, Brad Snyder, and Mark     
Tushnet. I am also grateful for research assistance from Daniel Emam and Dani 
Zylberberg, and from Thanh Nguyen and his colleagues at Georgetown’s Edward 
Bennett Williams Law Library. 
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was necessary, but disagreed about which federal court 
should provide such review. The scope of habeas jurisdiction 
during this period, as before and after, reflected the Justices’ 
views about the proper allocation of jurisdiction among fed-
eral courts to review the state courts’ decisions on constitu-
tional questions arising in criminal cases resulting in cus-
tody. 
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In Brown v. Allen, decided in 1953, the Supreme Court held that 
federal courts adjudicating the habeas petitions of persons convicted 
of crimes in state court should apply a de novo standard of review 
with respect to issues of law and of application of law to fact.1 This 
                                                                                                             
 1 See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 507 (1953) (“Where the ascertainment 
of the historical facts does not dispose of the claim but calls for interpretation of 
the legal significance of such facts, the District Judge must exercise his own judg-
ment on this blend of facts and their legal values.”); Justice Frankfurter’s analysis 
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standard of review prevailed until the Supreme Court in Williams v. 
Taylor interpreted the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty 
Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) as establishing a standard of review more 
deferential to state courts.2 Whether Brown’s de novo standard was 
a departure from the standard the courts had previously applied in 
habeas cases is a famously disputed question. In an influential arti-
cle, Professor Paul M. Bator argued that the Court in Brown broadly 
expanded the availability of habeas relief to state prisoners, an ex-
pansion that he criticized as undesirable as well as unprecedented.3 
Before Brown, he argued, the federal courts properly declined to 
grant habeas relief to state prisoners unless the state court had failed 
to provide a full and fair hearing of the petitioner’s constitutional 
claims.4 In Professor Bator’s view, the limited scope of federal ha-
beas review meant that the state courts often had the final word re-
garding the federal constitutional rights implicated in state criminal 
proceedings.5 This view was disputed by Justice Brennan, who, in 
Fay v. Noia, maintained that habeas courts had always provided ple-
nary review of state prisoners’ fundamental rights.6 Justice Bren-
nan’s version of the history was defended at some length by Profes-
sor Gary Peller.7 
More recently, Professor James Liebman has offered a third ver-
sion of the pre-Brown history, arguing that both Professor Bator, on 
the one hand, and Justice Brennan and Professor Peller, on the other 
                                                                                                             
on this point was expressly endorsed by Justices Burton and Clark, see id. at 488, 
and Justices Black and Douglas, see id. at 513. See also Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 
277, 287–88 n.4 (1992). 
 2 See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 390–91 (2000). See also Antiterror-
ism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 
(1996). 
 3 See Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus 
for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441, 499–501 (1963). 
 4 Id. at 463–64, 465 (“The understanding seemed to be much nearer to the 
guideposts set out above: a prisoner is not held in ‘violation’ of federal law if a 
state court of competent jurisdiction has through fair process—though perhaps 
erroneously—decided that question on the merits.”). 
 5 See id. at 448–49. 
 6 Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 426–27 (1963). 
 7 See generally Gary Peller, In Defense of Federal Habeas Corpus Relitiga-
tion, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 579, 581–82 (1982). 
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hand, had gotten parts of the history wrong.8 According to Professor 
Liebman, the habeas statutes always authorized de novo review of 
constitutional issues decided by the state courts, but only “where the 
writ is the only effective means of preserving [the petitioner’s] 
rights.”9 During the Nineteenth Century, habeas was almost never 
necessary for this purpose, as any person convicted in the state 
courts had a right to Supreme Court review of any federal questions 
decided against her by the state courts.10 When the Supreme Court’s 
appellate jurisdiction became discretionary, however, the lower fed-
eral courts’ habeas jurisdiction expanded to fill the gap.11 The writ 
then became the only effective means of preserving the constitu-
tional rights of state prisoners.12 In Professor Liebman’s telling, fed-
eral review of state court criminal convictions was always available, 
but the forum responsible for providing such review shifted in the 
early part of the Twentieth Century.13 
Although Professor Liebman did not use the term, he argued es-
sentially that the Supreme Court’s rules addressing the scope of ha-
beas review served a forum-allocation function: these rules allocated 
among federal courts the responsibility for monitoring the state 
courts’ protection of the constitutional rights of state criminal de-
fendants.14 Before the shift, the Supreme Court was responsible for 
                                                                                                             
 8 See generally James S. Liebman, Apocalypse Next Time?: The Anachro-
nistic Attack on Habeas Corpus/Direct Review Parity, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1997, 
2055–94 (1992). 
 9 Id. at 2055 (quoting Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101, 105 (1943)). 
 10 See id. at 2068–75. 
 11 See id. at 2075–80. 
 12 See id. 
 13 See id. at 2073–75. 
 14 All rules of federal jurisdiction are “forum allocating” in the sense that they 
distribute judicial power between federal and state courts. I use the term to de-
scribe the distribution of judicial power among federal courts. This sense of the 
term can be traced to Vicki C. Jackson’s thesis that the Eleventh Amendment 
serves a forum-allocation function by allocating the power to enforce the federal 
obligations of the states between the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts. 
See Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amendment, and State 
Sovereign Immunity, 98 YALE L.J. 1, 14–15, 74 (1988). The Supreme Court re-
jected the forum allocation understanding of the Eleventh Amendment in Alden 
v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999). See Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Sovereign Immunity, 
Due Process, and the Alden Trilogy, 109 YALE L.J. 1927, 1927–30 (2000). See 
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providing such review; afterwards, the lower federal courts were re-
sponsible for doing so.15 At no point were state prisoners’ constitu-
tional rights relegated to the state courts without de novo federal re-
view, as Professor Bator had argued.16 
This Article offers a fourth version of the pre-Brown history, 
bridging in some respects the other contending versions. The pre-
Brown cases show that Professor Liebman is right about the reason 
for the Twentieth Century expansion of the availability of habeas 
review for state prisoners.17 As discussed in Part I of this Article, de 
novo federal court review of state criminal convictions was availa-
ble throughout the Nineteenth and early Twentieth Centuries.18 Un-
til 1916, state prisoners (like all state court litigants) had a right to 
review in the Supreme Court of any federal issue decided against 
them. Before 1867, the federal courts’ habeas jurisdiction generally 
did not even extend to state prisoners. After that date, the Court ar-
ticulated and enforced a rule under which the habeas courts were 
generally to deny relief to state prisoners convicted of crimes in state 
courts, the rationale being that direct review in the Supreme Court 
was available as of right and should ordinarily be pursued. Professor 
Liebman is correct to note that the rule requiring federal habeas 
courts to stay their hands fell away in direct response to the Supreme 
Court’s renunciation of the error-correction role it had previously 
fulfilled.19 
But Professor Bator is closer to being right regarding the timing 
of the expansion of habeas jurisdiction. Professor Liebman dates the 
shift from direct review in the Supreme Court to de novo review in 
                                                                                                             
also Carlos Manuel Vázquez, What Is Eleventh Amendment Immunity?, 106 YALE 
L.J. 1683, 1700–08 (1997). 
 15 See Liebman, supra note 8, at 2072–78. 
 16 See id. at 2080 (“[F]ollowing the certiorarification of the Court’s direct 
appellate docket, the Court’s inability to satisfy by itself the federal courts’ statu-
tory obligation to conduct review as of right, according to those principles, of the 
constitutionality of state detention thrust the obligation on the lower federal courts 
on habeas corpus.” (emphasis in original)). 
 17 See infra Part II. 
 18 See Jordan M. Steiker, Habeas Corpus, ENCYC. OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 
(2002), http://www.encyclopedia.com/social-sciences-and-law/law/law/habeas-
corpus. 
 19 See Liebman, supra note 8, at 2073–77 
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the habeas courts to the Court’s 1915 decision in Frank v. Mag-
num.20 Although the first statute replacing (some of) the Court’s 
mandatory writ of error review with discretionary writ of certiorari 
review was enacted in 1916, Professor Liebman argues that Frank 
responded to an unofficial “certiorarification” of direct review that 
preceded the formal certiorarification beginning in 1916.21 
But, as discussed in Part II of this Article, the pre-Brown cases 
tell a somewhat different story. Well after the 1916 amendments to 
the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction, the Court continued to 
recite and apply the restrictive standards it had applied before the 
amendments.22 As this Article shows, the cases demonstrate that, 
long after the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction over state court judg-
ments became formally discretionary, the Court continued to regard 
itself as the appropriate forum for review of state criminal convic-
tions. The Court realized only gradually that it could not hope to 
perform an error-correction function, and only then did it finally 
abandon the pre-1916 limits on habeas review of state criminal con-
victions.23 
In particular, this Article shows that the years between 1916 and 
1953 were a transitional period characterized by disagreement 
among the Justices about the appropriate scope of habeas review. 
The Justices agreed that meaningful federal review of state criminal 
convictions was necessary, but they disagreed about whether such 
review should take place in the Supreme Court on direct review or 
in the lower federal courts via habeas corpus.24 Some Justices be-
lieved strongly that, in the absence of exceptional circumstances, 
only the Supreme Court should undertake the sensitive task of re-
viewing state court convictions and potentially setting free a person 
whose conviction had been upheld by the highest state court. In the 
view of these Justices, the Court should continue to perform an er-
ror-correction function in exercising its discretionary certiorari ju-
risdiction over state criminal convictions. Other Justices believed 
that the lower federal courts were better situated to perform such 
                                                                                                             
 20 See id. See generally Frank v. Magnum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915). 
 21 See Liebman, supra note 8, at 2075–77 
 22 See infra text accompanying notes 136–160. 
 23 See infra Part II. 
 24 See id. 
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review via habeas corpus.25 The latter view gradually came to pre-
vail as the Justices came to realize that they could no longer feasibly 
fulfill an error-correction function. Brown v. Allen confirmed this 
shift in 1953 by holding both that the habeas courts should no longer 
regard a denial of certiorari as reflecting the Court’s views on the 
merits of a state criminal defendant’s legal claims and that the ha-
beas courts should review questions of law and mixed questions of 
law and fact de novo.26 
Although the cases tend to support Professor Bator’s story inso-
far as the timing of the expansion of habeas review is concerned, 
they also show that he was wrong about the reason for the restricted 
availability of habeas relief in the decades before the Brown deci-
sion. At no point did the Court relegate state prisoners to the state 
courts for the protection of their constitutional rights. The need for 
broad federal review of state criminal convictions was recognized 
throughout. The narrow scope of review in the decades after 1916 
was based on the Court’s continuing conviction that, despite the 
newly discretionary nature of its appellate jurisdiction, it alone 
should be the federal forum reviewing and possibly reversing state 
criminal convictions.27 The loosening of the restrictions on the lower 
courts’ exercise of their habeas jurisdiction was based on the Court’s 
gradual realization that it could no longer hope to monitor state court 
decisions resulting in custody.28 This realization led the Court to 
conclude that the writ of habeas corpus was the only effective means 
of preserving the constitutional rights of state prisoners.29 Although 
some pre-Brown cases included language or reasoning foreshadow-
ing the shift, the first clear articulation of the de novo standard came 
in Brown v. Allen.30 
The pre-Brown history of habeas corpus has potentially im-
portant implications for current debates about the scope of habeas 
relief for state prisoners. In Wright v. West, Justice Thomas relied 
on Professor Bator’s claim that Brown’s standard was aberrational 
                                                                                                             
 25 See infra Part II and text accompanying notes 221–44. 
 26 See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 489–97, 507 (1953) (opinion of Frank-
furter, J.). 
 27 See infra text accompanying notes 148–58, 192–214. 
 28 See infra text accompanying notes 221–44. 
 29 See id. 
 30 See Brown, 344 U.S. at 507 (opinion of Frankfurter, J.) 
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in urging a return to a more deferential standard.31 Justice O’Connor, 
for her part, relied on Justice Brennan’s history in arguing that any 
change in the standard should come from Congress.32 The new un-
derstanding of the pre-Brown standard defended here exposes as un-
precedented Justice Thomas’ proposal to narrow the scope of habeas 
review without correspondingly broadening the availability of direct 
review in the Supreme Court. 
In enacting AEDPA in 1996, Congress amended the statute gov-
erning habeas relief for state prisoners, and a slim majority of the 
Court in Williams v. Taylor held that Congress had adopted Justice 
Thomas’ deferential habeas standard.33 Specifically, the Court held 
that, if the prisoner’s federal claim had been adjudicated on the mer-
its in the state courts, the habeas court may not grant relief merely 
because the state court’s decision was erroneous; it may grant relief 
only if the state court’s error was unreasonable.34 In other words, 
AEDPA (as interpreted in Williams35) replaces the de novo standard 
of review with a standard requiring the habeas courts to deny relief 
to state prisoners in custody pursuant to wrong but reasonable state 
court decisions.36 If so, then AEDPA consigns erroneously con-
victed state prisoners to continued imprisonment (or even execu-
tion). 
The long history of treating habeas as a forum-allocation de-
vice—as detailed in this Article—suggests an alternative under-
standing of AEDPA. AEDPA does not limit the Supreme Court’s 
power to review and reverse wrong but reasonable state court deci-
sions resulting in custody. Indeed, the statute’s sponsors believed 
that Congress lacked the constitutional power to limit the Supreme 
                                                                                                             
 31 See Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 285 (1992) (citing Bator, supra note 3, 
at 478–99). 
 32 See id. at 305–06 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment). 
 33 See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 410–13 (2000).  
 34 See id. at 412–13. See also Carlos M. Vázquez, AEDPA as Forum-Alloca-
tion Rule 101–02 (Jan. 18, 2017) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) 
[hereinafter Vázquez, AEDPA as Forum-Allocation Rule]. 
 35 See Williams, 529 U.S. at 390–91. 
 36 See id. at 385. See also Jordan M. Steiker, Habeas Corpus, ENCYC. OF 
CRIME AND JUSTICE (2002), http://www.encyclopedia.com/social-sciences-and-
law/law/law/habeas-corpus. 
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Court’s appellate jurisdiction over state criminal convictions.37 The 
Court’s long-standing treatment of habeas and direct review as al-
ternative mechanisms for providing the necessary federal review of 
state criminal convictions invites an interpretation of AEDPA as 
shifting back to the Supreme Court the responsibility for monitoring 
state court decisions and granting relief for wrong but reasonable 
state court convictions.38 
At the same time, the Court’s reasons for shifting the responsi-
bility for monitoring state court convictions to the lower federal 
courts exposes the highly dysfunctional nature of AEDPA if under-
stood as a forum-allocation device.39 The reasons that drove that 
shift are just as applicable today as they were in 1953. The Court is 
in no better position to fulfill an error-correction role with respect to 
state criminal convictions today than it was then. If anything, allo-
cating such a role to the Supreme Court would be even more dys-
functional today than it was in 1953. 
I develop and critique the forum-allocation reading of AEDPA 
elsewhere.40 This Article details the long history of treating habeas 
for state prisoners as allocating among the federal courts the power 
and responsibility for safeguarding the constitutional rights of per-
sons convicted of crimes in state court. I show that, before Williams, 
de novo federal review of legal and mixed questions decided by the 
state courts in cases resulting in custody was always understood to 
be necessary and that, between 1916 and 1953, the debate was not 
about whether state prisoners’ constitutional claims should be rele-
gated to state court; it was instead about whether federal review 
should be undertaken in the Supreme Court or the lower federal 
courts. The Court eventually concluded that it could not hope to 
monitor state court compliance with the constitutional rights of state 
court criminal defendants and accordingly expanded the lower fed-
eral courts’ power to do so via habeas. 
                                                                                                             
 37 141 CONG. REC. S7833 (daily ed. June 7, 1995) (statement of Sen. Kyl) 
(introducing an amendment titled “Stopping Abuse of Federal Collateral Reme-
dies” and stating that “it should go without saying that there is always a review in 
the U.S. Supreme Court from any decision of the highest court of a State. So there 
is ultimately still the potential for Federal review of a State court decision.”). 
 38 See Vázquez, AEDPA as Forum-Allocation Rule, supra note 34, at 101. 
 39 See id. at 102. 
 40 See generally id. 
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In Part I, I examine the period between the Founding and 1916, 
when Congress amended the statute governing the Supreme Court’s 
jurisdiction over cases from the state courts, replacing its mandatory 
writ of error jurisdiction with discretionary writ of certiorari juris-
diction. Until 1867, the habeas jurisdiction of the lower federal 
courts did not generally extend to state prisoners.41 During this pe-
riod, state prisoners were entitled to de novo review in the Supreme 
Court of legal and mixed questions of federal law decided against 
them in the state courts.42 Even after Congress extended the lower 
federal courts’ habeas jurisdiction to state prisoners, the Court inter-
preted the jurisdiction narrowly, channeling such cases to the Su-
preme Court. During this period, the Court regarded direct review 
as the proper mechanism for ensuring state court protection of the 
constitutional rights of persons convicted of crimes in state court. 
In Part II, the heart of the Article, I examine the period between 
1916 and the Court’s 1953 decision in Brown v. Allen. I show that 
this was a transitional one marked by disagreement among the Jus-
tices about whether the responsibility for monitoring state court de-
cisions resulting in custody should be allocated to the Court itself or 
to the lower federal courts on habeas. The evolution of the Justices’ 
views on this question is reflected mainly in the decisions that grad-
ually rejected the doctrine that a prior denial of certiorari should be 
understood to reflect the Justices’ views on the merits of the legal 
claims raised in the habeas petition. It is no accident that Brown v. 
Allen, the decision that all recognize as adopting a de novo standard 
of review of legal and mixed questions on habeas, was also the de-
cision that made clear that a prior denial of certiorari deserved no 
weight in the habeas calculus.43 The close link the Court perceived 
between the two issues reflects the Court’s understanding of the fo-
rum-allocation function of habeas jurisdiction. 
In Part III, I show that the Court continued to adhere to the de 
novo standard of review until the enactment of AEDPA in 1996. I 
review some of the limitations on habeas adopted by the Burger and 
Rehnquist Courts and show that, notwithstanding these limitations, 
                                                                                                             
 41 See infra text accompanying notes 57–59. 
 42 See infra text accompanying notes 55–56. 
 43 See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 489–97, 507 (1953) (opinion of Frank-
furter, J.). 
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the Court continued to recognize that federal review of state court 
decisions resulting in custody was necessary to ensure that the state 
courts “toe[d] the constitutional mark.”44 If the Court continues to 
believe this, and if AEDPA bars the lower federal courts from grant-
ing habeas relief for some constitutional errors that otherwise would 
warrant reversal of the conviction, then the Court will need to re-
think its current approach to granting direct review to state prisoners 
alleging constitutional violations. 
I. THE 1789–1916 PERIOD 
From the beginning of our history until after the Civil War, the 
federal courts generally lacked jurisdiction to grants writs of habeas 
corpus to persons in state custody.45 After the Civil War, the habeas 
jurisdiction of the federal courts was extended to persons in state 
custody, but, as discussed below, the Court articulated and enforced 
extra-statutory rules according to which the federal courts were or-
dinarily to deny relief to persons who were being criminally tried or 
had been convicted in the state courts.46 Nevertheless, during this 
entire period, state prisoners had a right of access to the federal 
courts for de novo review of questions of federal law and of appli-
cation of such law to fact. State prisoners had access to the Supreme 
Court, whose jurisdiction over federal questions decided in the state 
courts against a federal right-holder was mandatory.47 The extra-
statutory limits on the lower federal courts’ habeas jurisdiction were 
justified by the Court on forum-allocation grounds: the proper forum 
for reviewing state criminal convictions was the Supreme Court on 
direct review, not the lower federal courts on collateral review.48 
                                                                                                             
 44 Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638, 653 (1984) (Powell, J., concurring) (quot-
ing Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 687 (1971)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 45 See infra text accompanying notes 57–59. 
 46 See Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts, FED. JUD. CTR., 
http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/jurisdiction_habeas.html (last visited 
Jan. 25, 2017). See, e.g., Ex Parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 375 (1879); Ex Parte 
Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 251–52 (1886); In re Frederich, 149 U.S. 70, 78 (1893). 
 47 See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 73, 85–86. See generally 
Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts, supra note 46. 
 48  See infra text accompanying notes 85–88. 
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The Founders agreed that the Constitution should provide for 
federal courts in order to ensure state compliance with federal law 
and to protect federal rights.49 Some believed that the Constitution 
should establish federal courts to adjudicate federal law in the first 
instance.50 Others believed that it would be sufficient to provide for 
Supreme Court review of state court decisions regarding federal 
law.51 As a result of the well-known “Madisonian Compromise,”52 
the Constitution created a Supreme Court and gave it jurisdiction to 
review state court decisions on federal questions while also empow-
ering Congress to create lower federal courts, if it desired, to hear 
federal claims in the first instance.53 The Constitution’s default 
mechanism for monitoring state court enforcement of federal law 
was thus Supreme Court review of state court decisions on federal 
questions. 
The Constitution gave Congress the power to make exceptions 
to the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction.54 Nevertheless, the Judiciary 
Act of 1789 provided for mandatory Supreme Court review by writ 
of error of state court decisions in which an asserted federal right or 
privilege had been denied.55 Thus, from the beginning, persons con-
victed of a crime in state court—like all litigants in the state courts—
had a right to Supreme Court review of any federal claims or de-
fenses they had raised that the state court had denied.56 
Congress did not grant to the federal courts a general authority 
to grant habeas relief to state prisoners until after the Civil War.57 
The Judiciary Act of 1789 provided:  
                                                                                                             
 49 See generally RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART & WECHSLER’S THE 
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 6–7 (7th ed. 2015). 
 50 See id. at 7–9. 
 51 See id. 
 52 See id. at 8. 
 53 See id. at 18–19. 
 54 U.S. CONST. art III, § 2, cl. 2. 
 55 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 73, 85–86. 
 56 See, e.g., Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 406–12, 415–16 (1821) (holding 
that Supreme Court review of such cases does not violate the Eleventh Amend-
ment). 
 57 Pursuant to amendments enacted in 1833 and 1842, the federal courts did 
have the authority to grant habeas relief (a) to persons in state or federal custody 
“for any act done or omitted in pursuance of a law of the United States, or of any 
order, process, or decree of any judge or court of the United States,” and (b) to 
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[t]hat writs of habeas corpus shall in no case extend 
to prisoners in gaol, unless where they are in custody, 
under or by colour of the authority of the United 
States, or are committed for trial before some court 
of the same, or are necessary to be brought into court 
to testify.58  
As a result of this proviso, the federal courts were empowered to 
grant habeas relief only to federal prisoners.59 The Judiciary Act of 
1789 thus entitled persons convicted of crimes in state court to fed-
eral review of their convictions, but allocated the responsibility of 
performing such review to the Supreme Court rather than the lower 
federal courts. 
In 1867, Congress amended the Judiciary Act to authorize ha-
beas relief “in all cases where any person may be restrained of his 
or her liberty in violation of the constitution, or any treaty or law of 
the United States . . . .”60 The amendment thus conferred jurisdiction 
on the federal courts to grant habeas relief to persons in either state 
or federal custody. The Supreme Court did not have occasion to in-
terpret this provision until 1886,61 however, as Congress famously 
repealed the section of the Act authorizing appeals to the Supreme 
Court of the lower federal courts’ decisions under this Act.62 
In Ex parte Royall, the first case to address the availability of 
federal habeas relief for state prisoners after Congress restored the 
Court’s jurisdiction over such appeals, the Court addressed the rela-
tion between the lower federal courts’ jurisdiction to entertain ha-
beas petitions by persons in state custody and the Supreme Court’s 
obligation to review federal questions arising in state court through 
writ of error.63 Royall is best known for articulating what has since 
                                                                                                             
“subjects or citizens of foreign states, in custody under National or State authority 
for acts done or omitted by or under color of foreign authority, and alleged to be 
valid under the law of nations.” Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. 85, 101–02 (1869).  
 58 Judiciary Act of 1789 § 14. 
 59 The federal courts could only issue writs of habeas corpus ad testificandum 
on behalf of persons in state custody. 
 60 Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385, 385 (1867). 
 61 See Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 245 (1886). 
 62 See Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506, 514–15 (1868) (affirming constitu-
tionality of repeal). 
 63 Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. at 252–53. 
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become known as the rule of exhaustion of state remedies.64 The 
Court in Royall confirmed that the federal courts have the power 
under the 1867 statutes to grant habeas relief to persons in state cus-
tody who are restrained of their liberty in violation of the Constitu-
tion, but went on to hold that the courts have discretion as to the time 
and mode of exercising this power.65 “That discretion,” the Court 
held, 
should be exercised in the light of the relations exist-
ing, under our system of government, between the 
judicial tribunals of the Union and of the States, and 
in recognition of the fact that the public good re-
quires that those relations be not disturbed by unnec-
essary conflict between courts equally bound to 
guard and protect rights secured by the Constitu-
tion.66 
According to the Court, the federal courts should grant the writ 
immediately in “cases of urgency,” such as those “involving the au-
thority and operations of the General Government, or the obligations 
of this country to, or its relations with, foreign nations . . . .”67 But, 
in the absence of “special circumstances requiring immediate ac-
tion,” the court has discretion to remit the petitioner to the state 
courts, which have an equal obligation to give effect to federal con-
stitutional rights.68 What the Court in Royall held to be within the 
courts’ discretion morphed in later cases into a requirement to ex-
haust state court remedies, which today is a statutory requirement.69 
After state remedies have been exhausted, the Court in Royall 
went on to state, the habeas court 
                                                                                                             
 64 See id. See generally FALLON ET AL., supra note 49, at 1349–55. 
 65 Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. at 251–53. 
 66 Id. at 251. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. at 253. 
 69 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c) (2006) (“An applicant shall not be deemed to have 
exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State, within the meaning of 
this section, if he has the right under the law of the State to raise, by any available 
procedure, the question presented.”); Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. at 251–53. 
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has still a discretion whether, under all the circum-
stances then existing, the accused, if convicted, shall 
be put to his writ of error from the highest court of 
the State, or whether it will proceed, by writ of ha-
beas corpus, summarily to determine whether the pe-
titioner is restrained of his liberty in violation of the 
Constitution of the United States.70 
Again, however, what in Royall was left largely to the lower federal 
court’s discretion morphed into a stricter requirement in later cases. 
As the Court put it in In re Frederich, 
the general rule and better practice, in the absence of 
special facts and circumstances, is to require a pris-
oner who claims that the judgment of a state court 
violates his rights under the Constitution or laws of 
the United States, to seek a review thereof by writ of 
error instead of resorting to the writ of habeas cor-
pus.71 
In Royall, the Court cited Ex parte Bridges as a case in which 
the court had found it appropriate for the federal court to grant ha-
beas relief after exhaustion, rather than remit the petitioner to his 
writ of error.72 
Adverting to the argument that where a defendant has 
been regularly indicted, tried, and convicted in a 
State court, his only remedy was to carry the judg-
ment to the State court of last resort, and thence by 
writ of error to this court, [Justice Bradley in 
Bridges] said: “This might be so if the proceeding in 
the State court was merely erroneous; but where it is 
                                                                                                             
 70 Ex Parte Royall, 117 U.S. at 253. 
 71 In re Frederich, 149 U.S. at 78; accord Baker v. Grice, 169 U.S. 284, 290–
91 (1898); Whitten v. Tomlinson, 160 U.S. 231, 242 (1896); Ex parte Fonda, 117 
U.S. 516, 518 (1886); Duncan v. McCall, 139 U.S. 449, 460 (1891); Wood v. 
Brush, 140 U. S. 278, 289–90 (1891); Jugiro v. Brush, 140 U.S. 291, 295–97 
(1891); Cook v. Hart, 146 U.S. 183, 195 (1892); New York v. Eno, 155 U.S. 89, 
94 (1894); Pepke v. Cronan, 155 U.S. 100, 101 (1894); Bergemann v. Backer, 157 
U.S. 655, 659 (1895). 
 72 Ex Parte Royall, 117 U.S. at 253. 
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void for want of jurisdiction, habeas corpus will lie, 
and may be issued by any court or judge invested 
with supervisory jurisdiction in such case.”73 
Bradley was referring to the distinction, often invoked during this 
period, “between an erroneous judgment, and one that is illegal or 
void . . . .”74 As the Court put it in Ex parte Siebold, 
[t]he only ground on which this court, or any court, 
without some special statute authorizing it, will give 
relief on habeas corpus to a prisoner under convic-
tion and sentence of another court is the want of ju-
risdiction in such court over the person or the cause, 
or some other matter rendering its proceedings 
void.75 
The distinction between erroneous and void convictions was ar-
ticulated in cases such as Siebold, which involved petitions for ha-
beas corpus by persons in federal custody,76 but the Court came to 
apply the distinction to habeas petitions by state prisoners.77 In ad-
dition to the rendering court’s lack of jurisdiction over the defendant 
or the subject matter, the Court came to recognize, as among the 
flaws that render a conviction void, the unconstitutionality of the 
statute that the petitioner was convicted of violating or of the sen-
tence imposed.78 The cases gradually expanding the types of errors 
that render a criminal conviction void appear to base that conclusion 
on the Court’s evaluation of the importance of the right that was 
violated rather than any inherent characteristic of the state court’s 
error.79 Be that as it may, the permissible grounds for granting ha-
beas relief during this period were narrower than the grounds for 
reversing a state court conviction on direct appeal. 
                                                                                                             
 73 Id. 
 74 Ex Parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 375 (1879). 
 75 Id. 
 76 See generally id. at 373–75. 
 77 See, e.g., In re Frederich, 149 U.S. 70, 70 (1893). 
 78 See Bator, supra note 3, at 468. 
 79 This is the position defended by Professor Liebman, who disputes Profes-
sor Bator’s claim that habeas review was available only if the rendering court 
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Royall’s citation of Bridges suggested that cases in which the 
state court judgment was void were among those in which remitting 
the prisoner to his writ of error was not appropriate.80 Later cases, 
however, made clear that, except in cases of urgency, a petitioner 
would be left to his writ of error even in such cases.81 As Bridges 
illustrates, the Court did occasionally uphold a grant of habeas relief 
to a state prisoner, but, as the turn of the century approached, the 
Court’s insistence on the exclusivity of recourse to the writ of error 
grew more rigid,82 rendering largely moot the theoretical availability 
of habeas to release state prisoners whose convictions were void. 
Importantly, however, the Court’s curtailment of habeas relief 
for state prisoners during this period did not mean that federal relief 
for erroneously convicted state prisoners was unavailable.83 Such 
prisoners had a right to direct review of their convictions in the Su-
preme Court.84 The cases limiting the availability of habeas relief 
when writ of error review was available were explained in forum-
allocation terms. The Supreme Court was regarded as the more ap-
propriate forum for the adjudication of such cases because of the 
sensitivity of the reversal of a state criminal conviction that had been 
upheld by the state’s highest court: 
It is an exceedingly delicate jurisdiction given to the 
Federal courts by which a person under an indictment 
in a state court and subject to its laws may, by the 
decision of a single judge of the Federal court, upon 
a writ of habeas corpus, be taken out of the custody 
of the officers of the State and finally discharged 
therefrom, and thus a trial by the state courts of an 
indictment found under the laws of a State be finally 
prevented.85 
                                                                                                             
lacked jurisdiction or if the petitioner was convicted under an unconstitutional law 
or received an unconstitutional sentence. See Liebman, supra note 8, at 2041–48. 
 80 Ex Parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 253 (1886). 
 81 See, e.g., Baker v. Grice, 169 U.S. 284, 284 (1898). 
 82 See Liebman, supra note 8, at 2005, 2065–72. 
 83 See id. at 2070–73. 
 84 See id. 
 85 Baker, 169 U.S. at 291. 
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It was considered unseemly for a single lower federal court to set a 
state prisoner free and create “unnecessary conflict between courts 
equally bound to guard and protect rights secured by the Constitu-
tion.”86 Only review in the Supreme Court would be consistent with 
the dignity of the state courts and respect for their constitutional ob-
ligation to enforce federal rights.87 Confirming the forum-allocation 
nature of these rules, the Court did allow the grant of habeas relief 
in the few cases in which writ of error review was unavailable.88 
II. THE 1916–1953 PERIOD 
Beginning in 1916, the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction 
over state court decisions denying federal rights began to shift from 
being mandatory to being discretionary.89 In 1916, Congress for the 
first time made Supreme Court review of some state court decisions 
denying claims of federal rights discretionary.90 Writ of error review 
was retained for state court decisions upholding “an authority exer-
cised under any State” that had been challenged on federal grounds, 
as well as decisions upholding state statutes challenged on federal 
grounds or invalidating federal statutes or treaties on constitutional 
grounds.91 In other cases raising federal questions, review was avail-
able only through the discretionary writ of certiorari.92 Congress re-
stricted the scope of writ of error review further in 1925, retaining 
such review only for decisions upholding state statutes challenged 
on constitutional grounds or invalidating federal statutes or treaties 
on constitutional grounds.93 
Although some appeals of state criminal convictions continued 
to fall within the categories of cases subject to mandatory Supreme 
Court review under the 1916 and 1925 amendments to the Judiciary 
                                                                                                             
 86 New York v. Eno, 155 U.S. 89, 94 (1894). 
 87 See supra note 71. 
 88 See Liebman, supra note 8, at 2073, 2076–81. 
 89 See FALLON ET AL., supra note 49, at 462. 
 90 See id.  
 91 See id. at 463 n.3. 
 92 See Edward A. Hartnett, Questioning Certiorari: Some Reflections Sev-
enty-Five Years After the Judges’ Bill, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1643, 1658 (2000). 
 93 Congress eliminated mandatory Supreme Court review of state courts de-
cisions entirely in 1988. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 49, at 463. 
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Act, they constituted only a small portion of the state criminal con-
victions that fell within the Court’s mandatory jurisdiction before 
1916. Thus, after 1916, and especially after 1925, very few persons 
convicted of crimes in state court were entitled, as a statutory matter, 
to Supreme Court review of the federal issues that were decided 
against them by the state courts. 
All agree that de novo review was available to state prisoners via 
habeas corpus at least as of the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown 
v. Allen in 1953.94 Thus, at least as of that date, federal habeas re-
view filled the gap that was created by the elimination of mandatory 
Supreme Court review via writ of error. The situation during the 
decades before Brown v. Allen is a matter of some controversy, how-
ever. 
The scope of federal habeas review in the decades before Brown 
has been the subject of fierce debate among modern scholars. The 
controversy is reflected in the highly charged exchange of dicta be-
tween Justice Thomas and Justice O’Connor in Wright v. West.95 
One side of this debate, whose version of the pre-Brown history was 
endorsed by Justice Thomas,96 relies heavily on the analysis of Pro-
fessor Paul M. Bator in his influential article, Finality in Criminal 
Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners.97 This side 
contends that, before Brown v. Allen, habeas review was available 
only for claims that the state court lacked jurisdiction or denied a 
full and fair hearing for the constitutional claim.98 The other side of 
the debate, endorsed by Justice O’Connor in Wright v. West,99 was 
developed by Justice Brennan in Fay v. Noia,100 and later defended 
by Professor Gary Peller.101 This side contends that de novo review 
of constitutional claims was always available on habeas and that 
only the substantive protections provided by the Constitution in 
                                                                                                             
 94 See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 507 (1953) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.). 
See also Bator, supra note 3, at 444–45. 
 95 See Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 298–306 (O’Connor, J., concurring in 
judgment). 
 96 See id. at 285 (majority opinion). 
 97 See generally Bator, supra note 3. 
 98 See Wright, 505 U.S. at 285. 
 99 See id. at 304–05 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 100 See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 426–35 (1963). 
 101 See generally Peller, supra note 7, at 581–82, 616. 
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criminal trials expanded over the years.102 More recently, Professor 
James Liebman has argued that both Bator and Brennan/Peller got 
certain aspects of the history wrong and has defended an intermedi-
ate position.103 Liebman maintains that the availability of habeas re-
view of constitutional questions was limited when Supreme Court 
review of state criminal convictions was mandatory, but became ple-
nary when Supreme Court review became discretionary.104 
Justice Frankfurter understated matters when he wrote in 1947 
that the availability of habeas relief in the federal courts during this 
period was “an untidy area” of the law.105 Nevertheless, the cases do 
strongly support two interrelated theses. First, the period between 
1916 and 1953 was a transitional period characterized by disagree-
ment among the Justices about the appropriate scope of habeas re-
view. Second, the debate among the Justices was not about the need 
for meaningful federal review of state criminal convictions, but 
about whether such review should take place in the Supreme Court 
on direct review or in the lower federal courts via habeas corpus. 
The need for meaningful review in some federal court was recog-
nized on all sides; the disagreement was about the appropriate tribu-
nal. 
A. The Debate About the Scope of Habeas Review Before Brown 
The opening salvo in the current debate about the scope of ha-
beas review of state criminal convictions during this period came 
from Professor Bator.106 Bator claimed that the basic rule during the 
Nineteenth Century was that habeas relief was available only to 
challenge the jurisdiction of the committing court, although he 
acknowledged that the concept of “jurisdiction” was stretched to in-
clude the constitutionality of the law under which the petitioner was 
convicted and the constitutionality of the sentence imposed,107 and 
he acknowledged that some cases were difficult to reconcile with his 
claim.108 According to Bator, the Court broadened the availability 
                                                                                                             
 102 See id. at 690–91. 
 103 See Liebman, supra note 8, at 2093. 
 104 See id. at 2072–80, 2092–93. 
 105 Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S. 174, 184 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
 106 See generally Bator, supra note 3. 
 107 See id. at 468, 483–84. 
 108 See id. at 470–71. 
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of habeas review in Frank v. Magnum,109 holding that mob domina-
tion of the court and jury would be a cognizable claim on habeas if 
the state court system failed to cure the problem by offering an un-
tainted hearing.110 In his view, the Court in Moore v. Dempsey111 
applied this standard and concluded that habeas relief was required 
because the state had failed to provide an untainted hearing for the 
claim of mob domination.112 According to Professor Bator, the 
Court in Brown v. Allen radically expanded the availability of ha-
beas relief by holding for the first time that habeas was available for 
the relitigation of constitutional claims that had been fully and fairly 
litigated in the state courts.113 
Justice Brennan and Professor Peller, for their part, argued that 
federal habeas jurisdiction was available for the relitigation of con-
stitutional claims from the beginning.114 The Nineteenth Century de-
nials of relief during earlier periods merely reflected the narrow 
scope then given to substantive constitutional rights.115 The apparent 
broadening of habeas relief reflected in Moore and then in Brown 
actually resulted from the progressive broadening of constitutional 
protections in the criminal sphere.116 
Professor Liebman argues that both Bator and Peller get the his-
tory wrong in certain respects.117 Liebman argues that the 1867 stat-
ute always authorized review of constitutional issues decided by the 
state courts, but only “where the writ is the only effective means of 
                                                                                                             
 109 See id. at 487, 523 (commenting on Frank v. Magnum, 237 U.S. 309, 329–
36 (1915)). 
 110 See id. at 486–87. 
 111 Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 90–92 (1923). 
 112 See Bator, supra note 3, at 488–91 (commenting on Moore, 261 U.S. at 
90–92). 
 113 See id. at 500–01. 
 114 See Peller, supra note 7, at 581–82, 662–63. See also Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 
391, 426 (1963) (“Congress in 1867 sought to provide a federal forum for state 
prisoners having constitutional defenses by extending the habeas corpus powers 
of the federal courts to their constitutional maximum. Obedient to this purpose, 
we have consistently held that federal court jurisdiction is conferred by the alle-
gation of an unconstitutional restraint and is not defeated by anything that may 
occur in the state court proceedings.”). 
 115 See Peller, supra note 7, at 616–22. 
 116 See id. at 643–49. 
 117 Liebman, supra note 8, at 2093. 
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preserving his rights.”118 During the Nineteenth Century, habeas 
was almost never necessary for this purpose, as any person con-
victed in the state courts had a right to Supreme Court review of any 
federal questions decided against him by the state court.119 Thus, the 
Court during this period established that federal habeas corpus was 
not available as a substitute for writ of error review, holding that the 
writ of error was the exclusive remedy.120 But, according to Lieb-
man, the Court abandoned its rule treating writ of error review as 
exclusive in the early Twentieth Century when its mandatory writ of 
error jurisdiction came to be replaced by discretionary certiorari ju-
risdiction.121 
The replacement of mandatory review with discretionary review 
happened officially with the enactment of legislation amending the 
statutes governing the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction in 
1916 and 1925,122 but Professor Liebman claims that the change be-
gan to occur “unofficially” shortly before that.123 Thus, he explains 
Frank v. Magnum’s failure to rely on the exclusivity of writ of error 
review in 1915 as resulting from the unofficial “certiorarification” 
of the Court’s appellate jurisdiction,124 and he argues that the Moore 
v. Dempsey decision in 1923 was based on the statutory shift to cer-
tiorari review.125 The different outcomes in Frank and Moore, ac-
cording to Liebman, are attributable to their differing conceptions of 
the mob domination question.126 In Frank, the question was treated 
as one of fact, as to which de novo habeas review does not extend;127 
in Moore, the issue was treated as a mixed question subject to de 
novo review.128 In Liebman’s view, de novo relitigation of legal and 
                                                                                                             
 118 Id. at 2055 (quoting Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101, 105 (1943)). 
 119 See generally id. at 2068–73. 
 120 See Tinsley v. Anderson, 171 U.S. 101, 106 (1898). See also supra Part I. 
 121 See Liebman, supra note 8, at 2075. 
 122 See id.  
 123 See id. at 2077–78. 
 124 See id. Professor Liebman was referring to the Court’s practice of dismiss-
ing writs of error summarily if they did not present a substantial federal question. 
See id. 
 125 See id. 
 126 See id. at 2078–81. 
 127 See generally Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915). 
 128 Liebman, supra note 8, at 2078–81; see generally Moore v. Dempsey, 261 
U.S. 86 (1923). 
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mixed questions on habeas has clearly been available since writ of 
error review was replaced by certiorari review.129 The only signifi-
cant change between Moore and Brown, in his view, was the in-
crease in the number of federal constitutional rights applicable in 
state criminal proceedings.130 
Professors Bator and Peller both acknowledge that some of the 
Court’s cases are in tension with their theories, as did Justice Bren-
nan.131 Their disagreement was thus about the overall thrust of the 
law during this period.132 Professor Liebman too recognizes that 
some of the cases are difficult to reconcile with his theory.133 In par-
ticular, he recognizes that the Court took “time to come to grips with 
the fact that the certioratification of its direct appeal docket made 
the Royall compromise untenable,” and that, “[a]lthough Frank and 
especially Moore adumbrated the Court’s eventual resolution, only 
Brown forthrightly adopted it . . . .”134 As the cases discussed below 
show, however, Brown was not a belated recognition of a change in 
the Court’s direct review that had occurred many years earlier. Ra-
ther, the pre-Brown cases reflected the continued belief by the Court 
                                                                                                             
 129 See id. at 2075–81. 
 130 See id. at 2081–83. 
 131 Professor Bator admitted that the Court gave no “consideration to the 
reaches and purposes of the habeas jurisdiction” between Frank and Brown and 
that “some opinions [] could be taken to intimate that the writ automatically 
reaches the merits of all federal constitutional questions.” Bator, supra note 3, at 
496–97. Justice Brennan conceded that the Court did not hold to an “unwavering 
line in its conclusions as to the availability of the Great Writ,” and that the avail-
ability of writ of error review prior to 1916 was “a powerful influence against the 
allowance of [habeas review for] . . . state prisoners . . . .” Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 
391, 411–13 (1963). Finally, in examining how denials of certiorari foreclosed 
habeas review of state-prisoner claims between Frank and Brown, Professor 
Peller explains that “Hawk and its progeny invited the federal habeas courts to 
give substantive weight to the Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari,” but that the 
lower courts at the time either “gave no weight to the Court’s denial[s]” or were 
in fact deferring to the Supreme Court, rather than the state courts. Peller, supra 
note 7, at 660–61. 
 132 See Peller, supra note 7, at 662–63. 
 133 See Liebman, supra note 8, at 2083 (noting that, although “some pre-
Brown cases assumed or concluded that the Court’s denial of certiorari did not 
supply the statutorily mandated review as of right . . . [o]ther decisions did give 
the denial of certiorari effect . . . .”). 
 134 Id. 
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(or some Justices), long after the Court had adopted a highly discre-
tionary approach reviewing state court decisions on other matters, 
that the Supreme Court had a duty to review the constitutional 
claims of persons convicted of crimes in state court. 
Professor Liebman is correct in arguing that the federal courts’ 
habeas jurisdiction expanded to fill the gap in federal review left by 
the certiorarification of the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdic-
tion.135 But the cases show that this certiorarification took consider-
ably longer to take hold with respect to state court decisions result-
ing in criminal convictions than in other cases. Well after 1916, a 
majority of Justices continued to adhere to the Court’s pre-1916 
view that the sensitive task of reviewing state court convictions and 
possibly releasing a state prisoner whose conviction had been af-
firmed by the highest state courts was a task solely for the Supreme 
Court itself to perform. Only when the Court came to realize that it 
could no longer hope to fulfill this error-correction role did the Court 
definitively abandon the pre-1916 preference for direct review as the 
exclusive mechanism for reviewing state court convictions. The 
Court wavered on this point in the years immediately preceding 
Brown. The Court’s definitive abandonment of its insistence on di-
rect review as the preferred mechanism for reviewing state court 
convictions is reflected in its holding in Brown that denials of certi-
orari do not reflect the Justices’ views on the merits of the petition-
ers’ federal claims. The Court’s holding in Brown that habeas courts 
should apply a de novo standard in deciding questions of law and 
mixed questions of law and fact was directly related to its holding 
that the Court’s denial of certiorari should be given no weight by 
federal courts adjudicating habeas petitions. 
B. The Court’s Gradual Expansion of Habeas Review Between 
1916 and 1953 
Professor Liebman is clearly right to note that habeas relief was 
generally unavailable when a state prisoner had a right to direct re-
view in the Supreme Court via writ of error. He also convincingly 
shows that, after the shift from mandatory to discretionary direct re-
view, the Court abandoned pre-1916 limits on the availability of ha-
                                                                                                             
 135 See Liebman, supra note 8, at 2083, 2092. 
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beas relief in direct response to the more limited availability of di-
rect review of state criminal convictions in the Supreme Court. But 
this shift did not occur on or around 1916. The shift was more grad-
ual and only completed with the Brown decision in 1953. 
1. THE COURT’S CONTINUED APPLICATION OF PRE-1916 LIMITS 
In the early post-1916 cases, the Court continued to invoke and 
apply the proposition that habeas relief is available only if the state 
court lacked jurisdiction or if for other reasons its judgment was 
void. In Knewal v. Egan, for example, the Court wrote that “[i]t is 
the settled rule of this court that habeas corpus calls in question only 
the jurisdiction of the court whose judgment is challenged.”136 As 
late as 1938, the Court was continuing to recite this limit on habeas 
relief. Thus, in Johnson v. Zerbst, the Court explained that “habeas 
corpus cannot be used as a means of reviewing errors of law and 
irregularities—not involving the question of jurisdiction—occurring 
during the course of trial; and ‘the writ of habeas corpus cannot be 
used as a writ of error.’”137 
At the same time, the Court expanded the concept of jurisdic-
tional errors to include errors that are not jurisdictional in any 
straightforward sense. Thus, in Johnson v. Zerbst, the Court con-
cluded that a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel dur-
ing the course of a trial “stands as a jurisdictional bar to a valid con-
viction and sentence depriving him of his life or his liberty.”138 The 
Court’s characterization of this defect as a jurisdictional one appears 
to have followed, in the Court’s analysis, from its view that the de-
nial of habeas relief for this type of error would have left the victim 
of a constitutional error remediless: “To deprive a citizen of his only 
effective remedy would not only be contrary to the ‘rudimentary de-
mands of justice’ but destructive of a constitutional guaranty specif-
ically designed to prevent injustice.”139 The Court appears to have 
concluded that any violation of constitutional rights was a “jurisdic-
tional” defect warranting habeas relief, reasoning that, “[s]ince the 
                                                                                                             
 136 See Knewel v. Egan, 268 U.S. 442, 445 (1925) (citing, inter alia, Frank, 
237 U.S. at 327). 
 137 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 465 (1938) (citing, inter alia, Knewal, 
268 U.S. 442) (quoting Woolsey v. Best, 299 U.S. 1, 2 (1936)). 
 138 Id. at 468. 
 139 Id. at 467 (quoting Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935)). 
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Sixth Amendment constitutionally entitles one charged with crime 
to the assistance of counsel, compliance with this constitutional 
mandate is an essential jurisdictional prerequisite to a federal court’s 
authority to deprive an accused of his life or liberty.”140 That the 
Court had reached this understanding of a “jurisdictional” defect, 
and thus of the available scope of habeas relief, is confirmed by its 
decision the following term in Bowen v. Johnston.141 After again re-
citing that “[t]he scope of review on habeas corpus is limited to the 
examination of the jurisdiction of the court whose judgment of con-
viction is challenged,”142 the Court went on to state: “But if it be 
found that the court had no jurisdiction to try the petitioner, or that 
in its proceedings his constitutional rights have been denied, the 
remedy of habeas corpus is available.”143 
The Court abandoned the “jurisdictional” limitation with respect 
to claims of constitutional error a few years later in Waley v. John-
ston. The Court stated: 
[T]he use of the writ in the federal courts to test the 
constitutional validity of a conviction for crime is not 
restricted to those cases where the judgment of con-
viction is void for want of jurisdiction of the trial 
court to render it. It extends also to those exceptional 
cases where the conviction has been in disregard of 
the constitutional rights of the accused, and where 
the writ is the only effective means of preserving his 
rights.144 
Professor Liebman argues that this had been the rule all along.145 
State court convictions infected with constitutional error had always 
been understood to be “void,” but, when the Supreme Court’s ap-
pellate jurisdiction over state court decisions was mandatory, habeas 
                                                                                                             
 140 Id. at 467. 
 141 See Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U.S. 19, 24 (1939). 
 142 Id. at 23 (citing, inter alia, Knewal, 268 U.S. at 445). 
 143 Id. at 24 (citing, inter alia, Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 91 (1923); 
Johnson, 304 U.S. at 467) (emphasis added). 
 144 Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101, 104–05 (1943). 
 145 See Liebman, supra note 8, at 2055. 
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review was not “the only effective means of preserving [the pris-
oner’s] rights.”146 When the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction became 
discretionary, he argues, this rationale for denying habeas relief 
evaporated and habeas relief became widely available.147  
The cases discussed above, however, indicate that the “jurisdic-
tional” category came to encompass constitutional errors only grad-
ually. The demise of the preference for direct review of state crimi-
nal convictions also occurred more gradually. Indeed, the Court in 
Waley itself hinted at this latter limitation when it noted that habeas 
relief was appropriate in the case because “[t]he facts relied on are 
dehors the record and their effect on the judgment was not open to 
consideration and review on appeal.”148 This qualification suggests 
the Court’s continued adherence to the belief that habeas should not 
be used as a substitute for direct review in the Supreme Court. 
Earlier post-1916 cases are more explicit in asserting the exclu-
sivity of direct review, even in cases that did not appear to fall within 
the scope of the Court’s narrowed mandatory jurisdiction.149 Thus, 
in Craig v. Hecht, decided in 1923, the Court affirmed the denial of 
habeas relief on the ground that “[t]he Circuit Court of Appeals cor-
rectly applied the well-established general rule that a writ of habeas 
corpus cannot be utilized for the purpose of proceedings in error.”150 
And in Goto v. Lane, decided the following year, the Court affirmed 
the denial of habeas relief on the ground that: 
If [the court in which the petitioner was convicted] 
erred in determining [federal law], its judgment was 
not for that reason void . . . but subject to correction 
in regular course on writ of error. If the questions 
presented involved the application of constitutional 
principles, that alone did not alter the rule. And, if the 
petitioners permitted the time within which a review 
on writ of error might be obtained to elapse and 
thereby lost the opportunity for such a review, that 
                                                                                                             
 146 See Waley, 316 U.S. at 105. 
 147 See Liebman, supra note 8, at 2055–57, 2075–83. 
 148 Waley, 316 U.S. at 104. 
 149 See, e.g., Craig v. Hecht, 263 U.S. 255, 277 (1923); Goto v. Lane, 265 U.S. 
393, 402 (1924). 
 150 Craig, 263 U.S. at 277. 
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gave no right to resort to habeas corpus as a substi-
tute.151 
In United States ex rel. Kennedy v. Tyler, decided in 1925, the Court 
wrote: 
In so far as [the petitioner’s claims] involve treaty or 
constitutional rights, [the state] courts are as compe-
tent as the federal courts to decide them. In the regu-
lar and ordinary course of procedure, the power of 
the highest state court in respect of such questions 
should first be exhausted. When that has been done, 
the authority of this court may be invoked to protect 
a party against any adverse decision involving a de-
nial of a federal right properly asserted by him.152 
As late as the early 1940’s, the lower federal courts understood 
the Supreme Court’s doctrine on this question to be that “[w]hen [a 
state prisoner] has exhausted the judicial remedies afforded by the 
State and has secured a decision from its highest court, his sole re-
course will be to invoke the authority of the Supreme Court of the 
United States ‘to protect . . . against any adverse decision involving 
a denial of a federal right properly asserted . . . .’”153 
[I]n view of the delicate question of interference by 
inferior Federal courts with the judgment of the 
courts of a sovereign state of the Union which is pre-
sented by an application [for habeas corpus], it ap-
pears to be the approved practice that if such an ap-
plication is to be presented after exhaustion of the 
State judicial remedies, it should be made directly to 
the Supreme Court of the United States.154 
The Supreme Court addressed the issue in Ex parte Hawk, in 
1944, citing the foregoing lower court cases and others to the same 
                                                                                                             
 151 Goto, 265 U.S. at 402 (1924) (internal citations omitted). 
 152 United States ex rel. Kennedy v. Tyler, 269 U.S. 13, 17 (1925). 
 153 Hawk v. Olson, 130 F.2d 910, 912 (8th Cir. 1942) (quoting Kennedy, 269 
U.S. at 17). 
 154 Kramer v. Nevada, 122 F.2d 417, 419 (9th Cir. 1941). 
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effect, apparently with approval.155 The Court stated that, “[w]here 
the state courts have considered and adjudicated the merits of his 
contentions, and this Court has either reviewed or declined to review 
the state court’s decision, a federal court will not ordinarily reex-
amine upon writ of habeas corpus the questions thus adjudicated.”156 
The Court did qualify this rule: 
[W]here resort to state court remedies has failed to 
afford a full and fair adjudication of the federal con-
tentions raised, either because the state affords no 
remedy, or because in the particular case the remedy 
afforded by state law proves in practice unavailable 
or seriously inadequate, a federal court should enter-
tain his petition for habeas corpus, else he would be 
remediless.157 
These exceptions appear to align with Professor Bator’s view of the 
limited nature of federal habeas relief before Brown.158 
These cases are thus in tension with Professor Liebman’s claim 
that habeas review of constitutional issues became generally availa-
ble at the time of, and as a result of, the certiorarification of the Su-
preme Court’s appellate jurisdiction just before 1916.159 Even well 
after the Court’s mandatory review by writ of error was replaced by 
discretionary certiorari review, the Court continued to express the 
view that review of state criminal convictions should ordinarily oc-
cur in the Supreme Court on direct review rather than on collateral 
review through habeas corpus.160 
Nevertheless, the cases support a forum-allocation understand-
ing of habeas jurisdiction. As shown below, the Court determined 
the availability of habeas jurisdiction based on its views regarding 
the proper federal forum for reviewing state criminal convictions.161 
The limitations on the availability of habeas relief during this period 
                                                                                                             
 155 Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114, 116–17 (1944). 
 156 Id. at 118. 
 157 Id. 
 158 See Bator, supra note 3, at 463. 
 159 See Liebman, supra note 8, at 2075–80. 
 160 See, e.g., Craig v. Hecht, 263 U.S. 255, 277 (1923); see also Goto v. Lane, 
265 U.S. 393, 402 (1924). 
 161 See infra Part II.B.b. 
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did not reflect the view that state prisoners convicted as a result of 
constitutional error should nevertheless remain in prison. The 
Court’s continuing insistence that review of state criminal convic-
tions take place in the Supreme Court reflected its view that the Su-
preme Court itself was the appropriate forum for monitoring state 
court decisions resulting in custody, and that the Court remained ca-
pable of doing so. Gradually, as the constitutional rights of prisoners 
expanded and the number of cases increased, the Court reached the 
conclusion that it could no longer fulfill that role.162 It is no coinci-
dence that Brown v. Allen, the case that all agree affirmed the right 
to relitigate constitutional issues through habeas, was also the case 
in which the Court for the first time definitely held that a federal 
habeas court should give no weight to the Supreme Court’s previous 
denial of state prisoner’s petition for certiorari.163 
Today, the Supreme Court grants a minuscule proportion of the 
petitions for certiorari presented to it.164 It selects cases presenting 
important, broadly applicable issues in which the lower courts or the 
state courts have reached conflicting decisions.165 A petition arguing 
that the court below has made a case-specific constitutional error 
will rarely, if ever, be granted.166 If the Court had applied that stand-
ard during the years immediately following 1916, then many con-
victions vitiated by constitutional error would have remained un-
remedied as a result of the Court’s insistence that such convictions 
should ordinarily be reviewed by the Court itself or not at all. But, 
the Court did not apply today’s certiorari standard to certiorari peti-
tions by state prisoners until well after 1916.167 
                                                                                                             
 162 See id. at 2080. 
 163 See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 489–97, 507 (1953). 
 164 See, e.g., The Statistics: The Supreme Court 2014 Term, 129 HARV. L. REV. 
381, 389 (2015) (noting that in 2014 the Court only granted review for one percent 
of the petitions before it). 
 165 See STEPHEN M. SHAPIRO ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 239 (10th ed. 
2013). See also SUP. CT. R. 10. 
 166 See id. (“A petition for a writ of certiorari is rarely granted when the as-
serted error consists of erroneous factual findings or the misapplication of a 
properly stated rule of law.”) (internal quotation marks removed). 
 167 See id. 
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2. THE COURT’S EARLY APPROACH TO CERTIORARI 
The main advocate of limiting writ of error review and expand-
ing certiorari review was the Supreme Court itself, principally Chief 
Justice Taft.168 In advocating this change, the Justices assured Con-
gress that it would exercise its discretion with particular attention to 
its responsibility to protect constitutional rights.169 As far as the Jus-
tices’ statements to Congress revealed, Professor Hartnett writes, 
the only use envisioned in constitutional cases was as 
a way of quickly dealing with claims that were either 
frivolous or plainly governed by precedent—that is, 
in cases where the lower court was obviously correct 
and summary affirmance would be appropriate. Taft 
expressed confidence that in no case “would a con-
stitutional question of any real merit or doubt escape 
our review by the method of certiorari,” explaining 
that the restrictions were merely “to keep out consti-
tutional questions that have really no weight or have 
been fully decided in previous cases and that have 
only been projected into the case for the purpose of 
securing delay or a reconsideration of questions the 
decision of which has already become settled 
law.”170 
Consistent with this legislative history, the rule the Court 
adopted at the time to guide the exercise of its discretion with respect 
to certiorari differed substantially from the present rule.171 Today’s 
rule reflects the Court’s focus on ensuring uniformity in the inter-
pretation of federal law.172 The factors it takes into account in grant-
ing certiorari include only the existence of a conflict in the interpre-
tation of federal law among the courts of appeals or the state courts 
                                                                                                             
 168 See Hartnett, supra note 92, at 1660–72, 1666 n.101, 1715. 
 169 See id. at 1715. 
 170 Id. 
 171 Compare SUP. CT. R. 10 with William Howard Taft, The Jurisdiction of the 
Supreme Court Under the Act of February 13, 1925, 75 YALE L.J. 1,3 n.4 (1925). 
 172 See SUP. CT. R. 10. 
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and the importance of the legal question.173 The current rule also 
makes clear that “[a] petition for a writ of certiorari is rarely granted 
when the asserted error consists of . . . the misapplication of a 
properly stated rule of law.”174 
The 1925 version of the rule differed in important respects. Ac-
cording to the earlier rule, the “reasons which will be considered” in 
determining whether to grant certiorari included that “a state court 
has decided a federal question of substance . . . in a way probably 
not in accord with applicable decisions of this court.”175 As written, 
the rule suggests that the Court at that time understood its role, with 
respect to cases coming from the state courts, to include an error-
correction function. This would be consistent with the assurances 
the Chief Justice provided to Congress in advocating the shift to cer-
tiorari review.176 Under this standard, a denial of certiorari in a case 
coming from the state courts might be understood to reflect a deter-
mination by at least six Justices that the underlying constitutional 
question had—in the Chief Justice’s words—“no weight” or had 
been “projected into the case for the purpose of securing delay or a 
                                                                                                             
 173 See SHAPIRO ET AL., supra note 165, at 239. Rule 10 lists the following 
three factors: 
(a) a United States court of appeals has entered a decision in 
conflict with the decision of another United States court of ap-
peals on the same important matter; has decided an important 
federal question in a way that conflicts with a decision by a state 
court of last resort; or has so far departed from the accepted and 
usual course of judicial proceedings, or sanctioned such a de-
parture by a lower court, as to call for an exercise of this Court’s 
supervisory power; 
(b) a state court of last resort has decided an important federal 
question in a way that conflicts with the decision of another 
state court of last resort or of a United States court of appeals; 
(c) a state court or a United States court of appeals has decided 
an important question of federal law that has not been, but 
should be, settled by this Court, or has decided an important 
federal question in a way that conflicts with relevant decisions 
of this Court. 
SUP. CT. R. 10. 
 174 SUP. CT. R. 10. 
 175 See SUP. CT. R. 35.5(a), 266 U.S. 681 (1924). See also Taft, supra note 171, 
at 3 n.4. 
 176 See supra text accompanying note 170. 
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reconsideration of questions the decision of which has already be-
come settled law.”177 
Whether the Court in fact exercised its discretion in this way 
with respect to requests for review from persons convicted of crimes 
in state court is difficult to demonstrate directly. Since the Court 
does not explain its reasons for denying certiorari, it is difficult to 
establish definitively that such denials were tantamount to a deter-
mination on the merits that the underlying claim lacked merit. Nev-
ertheless, there is indirect support in the Justices’ opinions for the 
proposition that, at least in the early years after the shift from man-
datory to discretionary jurisdiction, the Justices so understood its 
denials of certiorari to petitions filed by state prisoners. 
As noted above, the early cases, up to and including Ex parte 
Hawk, reveal that, in the absence of exceptional urgency warranting 
a departure from the usual exhaustion rules, the Court insisted that 
state prisoners seek direct review in the Supreme Court and that, if 
the Court denied review, a lower federal court should ordinarily 
deny a subsequent habeas petition.178 In support of this procedure, 
the Court cited pre-1916 cases that, in turn, made clear that the ex-
clusivity of writ of error review was not just a matter of judicial ef-
ficiency.179 The rule was also based on the notion that reversing a 
state criminal conviction that had been upheld by the states’ highest 
courts was a delicate matter.180 It was thought to be unseemly for a 
single federal judge to set at liberty a duly convicted prisoner who 
had received several layers of review in the state courts.181 The 
Court’s forum-allocation rule was thus based on the conviction that, 
of the two available avenues for reviewing state criminal convic-
tions, direct review in the Supreme Court was superior from the 
standpoint of federal-state relations and respect for the dignity of 
state courts, and that the lower federal courts should accordingly 
grant habeas relief only in cases of peculiar urgency.182 
                                                                                                             
 177 See Hartnett, supra note 92, at 1731 n.488. 
 178 See supra text accompanying notes 148–160. 
 179 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Kennedy v. Tyler, 269 U.S. 13, 17 (1925) 
(citing, inter alia, Baker v. Grice, 169 U.S. 284, 291 (1898)). 
 180 See Baker, 169 U.S. at 291; Cook v. Hart, 146 U.S. 183, 195 (1892). 
 181 See supra notes 84–87, 148–60. 
 182 See id. 
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The Court’s continuing invocation of this preference after 1916 
means that the Court believed that this rationale retained force de-
spite the shift to discretionary review. This choice between two rem-
edies available in federal court makes sense only if direct review 
offered a realistic avenue for correcting the errors that would other-
wise be corrected in the lower federal courts on habeas. The idea 
was that it was the Supreme Court’s obligation to monitor state court 
compliance with federal law in criminal cases. And because “ought” 
presupposes “can,” the Court’s adherence to this allocation of juris-
diction reflects the Justices’ views that fulfilling this role was possi-
ble for the Court. 
3. POST-HAWK EROSION OF PREFERENCE FOR DIRECT REVIEW 
The Court’s decisions after Ex parte Hawk show the gradual ero-
sion of the pre-1916 limits on habeas review. At the same time, these 
cases provide additional support for the claim that these limits were 
continuously applied well into the 1916–1953 period. The post-
Hawk decisions wavered on whether a request for direct review in 
the Supreme Court should be a pre-requisite for seeking habeas cor-
pus in the lower federal courts. Moreover, the opinions in these cases 
show that the Justices who insisted on that requirement did so out of 
a belief, based on the dignitary concerns mentioned earlier, that re-
viewing a state conviction and possibly releasing a state prisoner 
was a role for the Supreme Court and not the lower federal courts. 
The cases show that, until at least the mid-1940s, these Justices be-
lieved the Supreme Court had a “duty of passing upon charges of 
state violations of federal constitutional rights” in such cases.183 
Gradually, the contrary view came to prevail. The debate be-
tween the Justices in these later cases sheds useful light on the ra-
tionale supporting the narrower availability of habeas review in the 
earlier period, as well as the rationale for dropping those limits. The 
limits were dropped because the Justices came to recognize that, in 
light of the Supreme Court’s increasing caseload, the Court could 
no longer hope to fulfill an error correction function, even in the 
subcategory of cases consisting of requests for direct review by state 
prisoners.184 
                                                                                                             
 183 Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 216 (1950). 
 184 See infra text accompanying notes 228–243. 
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Four years after Ex parte Hawk, the Court in Wade v. Mayo re-
laxed the requirement that a habeas petitioner must seek direct re-
view of his claims in the Supreme Court. The majority quoted the 
relevant passage from Ex parte Hawk, and agreed that: 
Considerations of prompt and orderly procedure in 
the federal courts will often dictate that direct review 
be sought first in this Court. And where a prisoner 
has neglected to seek that review, such failure may 
be a relevant consideration for a district court in de-
termining whether to entertain a subsequent habeas 
corpus petition.185 
Nevertheless, the Court declined to adopt a “hard and fast rule” 
requiring a prior request for direct review in the Supreme Court.186 
The majority cited “the volume of this Court’s business,”187 and said 
that “[m]atters relevant to the exercise of our certiorari discretion 
frequently result in denials of the writ without any consideration of 
the merits.”188 “Where it is apparent or even possible” that the Court 
would deny the petition for certiorari for reasons that do not reflect 
its views of the merits of the underlying claim, “failure to file a pe-
tition should not prejudice the right to file a habeas corpus applica-
tion in a district court.”189 The Court concluded that “it [was] rea-
sonably certain” that the petition for certiorari had been denied be-
cause of doubts about whether the state court judgment rested on an 
adequate state ground.190 
The majority’s analysis shows that even the Justices in favor of 
relaxing the requirement understood that a denial of certiorari in 
cases seeking review of state court convictions sometimes reflected 
the Justices’ views of the merits, and they appeared to require a 
showing of at least a possibility that such was not the case. But these 
Justices were willing to relax the requirement because, by this time, 
in their view, denials of certiorari “frequently” did not reflect the 
                                                                                                             
 185 Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672, 680 (1948). 
 186 See id. 
 187 Id. 
 188 Id. 
 189 Id. at 680–81. 
 190 Id. at 682. 
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Justices’ views of the merits and, in light of the volume of the 
Court’s business, “[g]ood judicial administration is not furthered by 
insistence on futile procedure.”191 
Writing for four Justices, Justice Reed strenuously dissented.192 
According to the dissenting Justices, “wise administration com-
mands that this Court be asked, by appeal or certiorari, to pass upon 
the federal constitutional questions presented. It is only by such a 
procedure that the validity of state criminal conviction can be expe-
ditiously and finally adjudicated.”193 Justice Reed elaborated: 
[W]henever a prisoner brings a petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus in the federal courts challenging col-
laterally a conviction in the state courts and asking 
release from state custody, serious questions of the 
relation between the federal and state judicial struc-
tures are raised. “It is an exceedingly delicate juris-
diction given to the federal courts, by which a person 
under an indictment in a state court, and subject to its 
laws, may, by a decision of a single judge of a federal 
court, upon a writ of habeas corpus, be taken out of 
the custody of the officers of the state and finally dis-
charged therefrom . . . .” Respect for the theory and 
practice of our dual system government requires that 
federal courts intervene by habeas corpus in state 
criminal prosecutions only in exceptional circum-
stances.194 
Justice Reed referred to appeal and certiorari as “the normal paths 
of review” which, when “open to correct federal constitutional er-
rors in state criminal proceedings,” bear upon the desirability of lim-
iting the habeas corpus power of federal courts in respect of state 
criminal prosecutions.195 
                                                                                                             
 191 Id. at 681. 
 192 See id. at 684–98 (Reed, J., dissenting). 
 193 Id. at 687 (Reed, J., dissenting). 
 194 Id. at 691 (Reed, J., dissenting) (quoting Baker v. Grice, 169 U.S. 284, 291 
(1898)). 
 195 Id. at 692 (Reed, J., dissenting). See also id. at 694 (“Where there is a denial 
of constitutional rights by the highest court of a state, a remedy exists by direct 
review in this Court.”). 
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It is not seemly that years after a conviction, when 
time has dulled memories, when death has stilled 
tongues, when records are unavailable, convicted fel-
ons, unburdened by any handicap to a normal presen-
tation of any claim of unfairness in their trial, should 
be permitted to attack their sentences collaterally by 
habeas corpus because of errors, known to them at 
the time of trial.196 
Although Justice Reed did not directly state that a denial of cer-
tiorari ordinarily reflects the Justices’ view that the petitioner’s 
claims are unmeritorious, this appears to be the implication of his 
insistence that the availability of certiorari review—the “normal” 
“remedy” for constitutional errors in the state courts—should ordi-
narily preclude habeas relief,197 despite his agreement that the writ 
of habeas corpus is “a proper procedure ‘to safeguard the liberty of 
all persons . . . against infringement through any violation of the 
Constitution.’”198 That this was his view is confirmed by his written 
opinion for the majority in Darr v. Burford, discussed below.199 
Between the decisions in Wade v. Mayo and Darr v. Burford, 
Congress amended the habeas statute.200 The amendment codified 
the exhaustion rule of Ex parte Hawk in the following terms: 
Sec. 2254. State custody; remedies in State courts. 
An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf 
of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a 
State court shall not be granted unless it appears that 
the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in 
the courts of the State, or that there is either an ab-
                                                                                                             
 196 Id. at 695 (Reed, J., dissenting). 
 197 See id. at 690–92. 
 198 Id. at 690 (Reed, J., dissenting) (quoting Frank v. Magnum, 237 U.S. 309, 
331 (1915)). 
 199 See generally Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200 (1950). 
 200 See generally 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1952) (originally enacted as the Act of 
June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 967) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2016)). 
Congress enacted the amendment just two days after the decision in Wade v. Mayo 
came down, so Congress did not take the decision into account in its deliberations. 
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sence of available State corrective process or the ex-
istence of circumstances rendering such process in-
effective to protect the rights of the prisoner. 
An applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted 
the remedies available in the courts of the State, 
within the meaning of this section, if he has the right 
under the law of the State to raise, by any available 
procedure, the question presented.201 
Although the amendment did not refer to direct review in the 
Supreme Court, the chairman of the committee appointed by the Ju-
dicial Conference of the United States to propose the amendment 
ultimately adopted, Judge John Parker of the Fourth Circuit, ex-
plained that its primary purpose was to ensure that review of state 
criminal convictions should take place solely in the Supreme Court 
except in exceptional circumstances: 
The thing in mind in the drafting of this section was 
to provide that review of state court action be had so 
far as possible only by the Supreme Court of the 
United States, whose review of such action has his-
torical basis, and that review not be had by the lower 
federal courts, whose exercise of such power is un-
seemly and likely to breed dangerous conflicts of ju-
risdiction.202 
The amendment accomplished this goal through its final clause: 
The effect of this last provision is to eliminate, for all 
practical purposes, the right to apply to the lower fed-
eral courts for habeas corpus in all states in which 
successive applications may be made for habeas cor-
pus to the state courts; for, in all such states, the ap-
plicant has the right, notwithstanding the denial of 
prior applications, to apply again to the state courts 
for habeas corpus and to have action upon such later 
                                                                                                             
 201 Id. (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2016)). 
 202 Hon. John J. Parker, Limiting the Abuse of Habeas Corpus, 8 F.R.D. 171, 
176 (1948). 
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application reviewed by the Supreme Court of the 
United States on application for certiorari.203 
According to Judge Parker, the holding of Wade v. Mayo would 
now “be in the teeth of” the habeas statute.204 As Parker described 
the effect of the amendment, 
[t]here is preserved in full the right of persons im-
prisoned under judgments of state and federal courts 
to ask release on the ground that they have been de-
nied the sort of trial guaranteed by the Constitution; 
but effective provision is made against the unseemly 
incidents which have arisen in the assertion of the 
right . . . .[T]here should be no more cases where pro-
ceedings of state courts, affirmed by the highest 
courts of the state, with denial of certiorari by the Su-
preme Court of the United States, will be reviewed 
by federal circuit or district judges.205 
Judge Parker did not expressly state that the amendment presup-
posed that Supreme Court denials of certiorari reflected the Justices’ 
view that the underlying claims were unmeritorious, but that is a fair 
inference from his statement that the amendment would avoid the 
“unseemly conflicts of jurisdiction which have arisen under recent 
habeas corpus decisions, without in anywise impairing the rights 
which it was the purpose of those decisions to protect.”206 
The Court relied in part on this amendment, and quoted Judge 
Parker’s article at length, when it reversed Wade v. Mayo in Darr v. 
Burford and reimposed a rigid requirement of prior request for Su-
preme Court review via certiorari (in the absence of exceptional cir-
cumstances warranting a departure from the exhaustion require-
ment).207 Justice Reed’s opinion for the Court in Darr explained the 
theory underlying the rule in greater depth.208 Again, Justice Reed 
                                                                                                             
 203 Id. 
 204 Id. at 178. 
 205 Id. 
 206 Id. (emphasis supplied). 
 207 Darr, 339 U.S. at 210–14, 212–13 n.34. 
 208 See id. at 206–07. 
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quoted Brice v. Grice regarding the “exceedingly delicate jurisdic-
tion” by which a single federal judge is empowered to release a state 
prisoner,209 adding that “[t]he jurisdiction is more delicate, the rea-
son against its exercise stronger, when a single judge is invoked to 
reverse the decision of the highest court of a State in which the con-
stitutional rights of a prisoner could have been claimed . . . .”210 
For this reason, 
It is this Court’s conviction that orderly federal pro-
cedure under our dual system of government de-
mands that the state’s highest courts should ordinar-
ily be subject to reversal only by this Court and that 
a state’s system for the administration of justice 
should be condemned as constitutionally inadequate 
only by this Court.211 
The Court referred to “[t]he responsibility to intervene in state crim-
inal matters,” which “rests primarily upon this Court,”212 explaining 
that state prisoners should be required to seek direct review because 
“[t]he opportunity to meet that constitutional responsibility should 
be afforded.”213 Justice Reed also referred to the Supreme Court’s 
“duty of passing upon charges of state violations of federal consti-
tutional rights.”214 If the Justices have a “responsibility” and a 
“duty” to pass upon constitutional questions that arise in state crim-
inal cases, and if that is the basis for limiting the discretion of the 
lower federal courts from doing so, then the Court’s disposition of 
petitions for certiorari by state prisoners must reflect the Justices’ 
views on the underlying merits of their claims. 
By the time of Darr v. Burford, it is likely that these views were 
those of a minority of the Court. Justice Reed purported to be leav-
ing open the question of “what effect the lower federal courts should 
accord a denial of certiorari by this Court when the state prisoner 
                                                                                                             
 209 Id. at 206 (quoting Baker v. Grice, 169 U.S. 284, 291 (1898)). 
 210 Id. at 207 (quoting Markuson v. Boucher, 175 U.S. 184, 187 (1899)). 
 211 Id. at 217. See also id. at 216 (“It is this Court which ordinarily should 
reverse state court judgments concerning local criminal administration.”). 
 212 Id. at 216. 
 213 Id. 
 214 Id. (emphasis added). 
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later applies for federal habeas corpus.”215 Justice Frankfurter’s dis-
sent understood Reed to be taking the position that the lower courts 
should treat a denial of certiorari as a decision on the merits.216 
Based on the excerpts from Reed’s opinion quoted above, Frankfur-
ter’s reading of Reed’s opinion was well grounded. Justice Reed’s 
denial of Frankfurter’s characterization of his views was only par-
tial: he conceded that a denial of certiorari might reflect doubts about 
whether the underlying decision rested on adequate state grounds, 
and suggested that the lower courts should be free to reach the merits 
of the habeas petition when the Court includes “an express direction 
that the petitioner may proceed in the federal district court without 
prejudice from the denial of his petition for certiorari.”217 In the end, 
Reed purported to leave that question open.218 
But, more importantly, two members of the majority filed a con-
curring opinion indicating that they joined Justice Reed’s opinion 
“except for any indication it may contain that, although the reasons 
for a denial of certiorari are not stated, they nevertheless may be 
inferred from the record.”219 In the view of Justices Burton and 
Clark, “when the reasons for a denial of certiorari are not stated, the 
denial should be disregarded in passing upon a subsequent applica-
tion for relief except to note that this source of possible relief has 
been exhausted.”220 It thus appears that a majority of the Court (the 
four dissenters and the two concurring Justices) had by this time 
concluded that a denial of certiorari did not ordinarily reflect the 
view that the underlying claims were unmeritorious. The views ex-
pressed by Justice Reed are nevertheless important—not because 
they reflect the views of a majority of the Court in 1950, but because 
they explain the rationale for the rule the Court adhered to until at 
least 1944. 
                                                                                                             
 215 Id. at 214.  
 216 See id.; id. at 224–27 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
 217 Id. at 214–16 (majority opinion). 
 218 Id. at 214 (stating “[t]he issue of the effect of such a denial apparently could 
arise only in a case where, after our refusal, the state prisoner presented his appli-
cation to another federal court. It is not here in this case. We doubt the effective-
ness of a voluntary statement on a point not in issue.”). 
 219 Id. at 219 (Burton, J., concurring). 
 220 Id. 
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In view of the concurring opinion of Burton and Clark, it is fair 
to infer that the views of a majority of the Court in 1950 regarding 
the meaning of a denial of certiorari filed by a state prisoner are re-
flected in Justice Frankfurter’s lengthy dissenting opinion in 
Darr.221 Frankfurter explained that the majority’s principal error 
was to treat the writ of certiorari as if it served the same function as 
the writ of error, when in fact the two are very different: 
A writ of error was a writ of right. It makes all the 
difference in the world whether a prisoner knocks at 
the door of this Court to invoke its grace or has un-
questioned access for the final determination of the 
federal question as to which the highest court of the 
State was merely an intermediate tribunal . . . .In the 
writ of error cases this Court held habeas corpus in 
the lower federal courts ought not to take the place of 
a mandatory appeal. But this jurisdictional situation 
was drastically changed by the Act of September 6, 
1916, 39 Stat. 726, and the Act of February 13, 1925, 
43 Stat. 936 . . . .After this shift from review as of 
right to review by grace, it could no longer be said 
that a litigant forwent his right to have this Court re-
view and reverse a State court. The right was gone. 
Only an opportunity—and a slim one—remained. It 
completely misconceives the doctrine which re-
quired a case to be brought to this Court by writ of 
error, because it was the duty of this Court to adjudi-
cate the claim on the merits, to apply it to the totally 
different factors involved in certiorari.222 
In arguing that state prisoners should not be required to seek cer-
tiorari before petitioning for habeas corpus,223 Frankfurter noted the 
variety reasons for denying certiorari, “which precludes the impli-
cation that were the case here the merits would go against the peti-
tioner.”224 In Justice Frankfurter’s words: 
                                                                                                             
 221 Id. at 227 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
 222 Id. at 235 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
 223 Id. at 228 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
 224 Id. at 227(Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
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Petitions may have been denied because, even 
though serious constitutional questions were 
raised, it seemed to at least six members of the Court 
that the issue was either not ripe enough or too mor-
ibund for adjudication; that the question had better 
await the perspective of time or that time would soon 
bury the question or, for one reason or another, it was 
desirable to wait and see; or that the constitutional 
issue was entangled with nonconstitutional issues 
that raised doubt whether the constitutional issue 
could be effectively isolated; or for various other rea-
sons not relating to the merits.225 
This approach to certiorari, Frankfurter explained, was a neces-
sary one. “It must be so unless the whole conception of certiorari in 
relation to the business of this Court is to be radically trans-
formed.”226 “The most weighty considerations of practical admin-
istration counsel against” requiring state prisoners to seek relief in 
the Supreme Court.227 Given the Court’s “increasing subjection of 
[s]tate convictions to federal judicial review through the expanded 
concept of due process” during the previous twenty years,228 and the 
resulting “flood of habeas corpus cases,”229 a requirement that state 
prisoners seek relief in the Supreme Court would mean that “[t]he 
burden of the Court’s volume of business will be greatly in-
creased . . . .”230 
Additionally, for a variety of reasons, the district courts are bet-
ter placed to address these claims than is the Supreme Court. First, 
“cases involving federal claims by State prisoners . . . frequently 
involve questions of State law which must be answered before the 
federal issue can be reached,”231 and the district courts are better 
situated to address such issues.232 Additionally, the Supreme Court 
                                                                                                             
 225 Id. (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
 226 Id. at 226 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
 227 Id. at 229 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
 228 Id. at 221 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
 229 Id. at 235 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
 230 Id. at 229 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
 231 Id.  
 232 Id.  
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“can dispose of [these cases] only as a matter of abstract pleading,” 
whereas “[t]he District Courts . . . can hold hearings when deemed 
appropriate, consider allegations on their merits if they are at all sub-
stantial and dispose of what often turn out to be unmeritorious 
claims.”233 For all of these reasons, “[i]n the present context of the 
Court’s business in relation to these cases—their volume and the 
required knowledge of local law with which the local federal judges 
are much more familiar than we can possibly be—all considerations 
of policy” support the conclusion that these cases belong in the dis-
trict courts rather than the Supreme Court.234 
In sum, Frankfurter’s dissent in Darr rests squarely on the recog-
nition that the Supreme Court could no longer effectively monitor 
state court compliance with federal constitutional law in the “flood” 
of criminal appeals resulting from the expansion of the constitu-
tional limits on state criminal proceedings, as well as on “policy” 
considerations making the lower federal courts the better forum for 
deciding these cases. Frankfurter’s arguments regarding the mean-
ing of a denial of certiorari seem self-evident to any observer of Su-
preme Court practice in 2017. What is noteworthy, however, is that 
these views are articulated in a dissenting opinion in 1950, thirty-
four years after the shift from writ of error to certiorari review.235 
Although it is possible that these views commanded the support of 
a majority of the Court by this time, the Court appears to have ar-
rived at the conclusions reached by Justice Frankfurter only gradu-
ally. 
The question of the weight to be given by habeas courts to the 
Supreme Court’s prior denial of certiorari was finally settled three 
years later in Brown v. Allen.236 In holding that such denials should 
be given no weight, Justice Frankfurter’s opinion for a majority re-
peated some of the same arguments found in his Darr dissent.237 For 
example, he elaborated on the reasons making the district courts 
                                                                                                             
 233 Id.  
 234 Id. at 236 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
 235 See supra text accompanying note 90. 
 236 See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 489–97 (1953) (opinion of Frankfurter, 
J.). Darr’s holding that habeas was available only if the petitioner had previously 
sought direct review in the Supreme Court through certiorari was not reversed 
until 1963. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 391 (1963). 
 237 See Brown, 344 U.S. at 489–97 (opinion of Frankfurter, J.). 
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more appropriate fora than the Supreme Court for deciding these 
cases: 
These petitions for certiorari are rarely drawn by law-
yers; some are almost unintelligible and certainly do 
not present a clear statement of issues necessary for 
our understanding, in view of the pressure of the 
Court’s work. The certified records we have in the 
run of certiorari cases to assist understanding are al-
most unknown in this field. Indeed, the number of 
cases in which most of the papers necessary to prove 
what happened in the State proceedings are not filed 
is striking. Whether there has been an adjudication or 
simply a perfunctory denial of a claim below is rarely 
ascertainable. Seldom do we have enough on which 
to base a solid conclusion as to the adequacy of the 
State adjudication. Even if we are told something 
about a trial of the claims the applicant asserts, we 
almost never have a transcript of these proceedings 
to assist us in determining whether the trial was ade-
quate. Equally unsatisfactory as a means for evaluat-
ing the State proceedings is the filing of opinions; in 
less than one-fourth of the cases is more than a per-
functory order of the State courts filed.238 
Thus, Brown reflects the Court’s preference for district courts 
over the Supreme Court on direct review as the forum for resolving 
these cases, a preference based on the Court’s view that the Court 
should be focusing on “questions of sufficient gravity,”239 as well as 
the burden that the “flood” of criminal cases would impose on the 
Court,240 and the fact that district courts are better situated to handle 
these cases for a number of reasons.241 The Court’s well-known 
holding in Brown, affirming the availability of de novo review of 
                                                                                                             
 238 Brown, 344 U.S at 493–94 (opinion of Frankfurter, J.). 
 239 Id. at 491 (opinion of Frankfurter, J.). 
 240 See Darr v. Burford, 399 U.S. at 235 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
 241 Id. at 493–94 (opinion of Frankfurter, J.). 
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legal and mixed questions,242 was directly tied to its largely forgot-
ten holding that Supreme Court denials of certiorari were to be given 
no weight by the lower courts entertaining habeas corpus peti-
tions.243 
In sum, even during the period between 1916 and 1953, the doc-
trine regarding the scope of habeas review in the lower federal courts 
served a forum-allocation function. Limitations on the availability 
of habeas review in the lower federal courts were justified on the 
ground that it was the responsibility of the Supreme Court to exer-
cise this “delicate jurisdiction.”244 Recognition of the need for re-
view of state convictions in some federal court was a constant; the 
debate was about which federal court should undertake such review. 
The view that state prisoners should remain in custody without fed-
eral review of claimed constitutional errors in their convictions was 
not reflected in majority opinions during this era. 
 
III. THE 1953–1996 PERIOD 
Between its decision in Brown v. Allen245 and the enactment of 
AEDPA in 1996,246 the Supreme Court adhered to the view that de 
novo review was available on habeas for cognizable constitutional 
claims. The Burger and Rehnquist Courts tightened the procedural 
requirements for obtaining habeas relief and placed some limits on 
the types of claims that could be the basis for habeas relief, and the 
new limits had a significant impact on the practical availability of 
habeas relief and were subjected to (mostly well deserved) criti-
cism.247 But, unlike the limits the Court held in Williams v. Taylor 
were imposed by AEDPA, the pre-AEDPA limits articulated by the 
Burger and Rehnquist Courts were largely consistent with the idea 
that state prisoners are entitled to a federal forum for the vindication 
of their constitutional rights. Even during this period, the Court’s 
                                                                                                             
 242 Id. at 507 (opinion of Frankfurter, J.). 
 243 Id. at 489–97 (opinion of Frankfurter, J.). 
 244 See Baker v. Grice, 169 U.S. 284, 291 (1898); Darr, 339 U.S. at 206–07. 
 245 See Brown, 344 U.S. 443 (1953). 
 246 See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996). 
 247 See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Ret-
roactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1808 (1991). 
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decisions reflected its view that federal review of state court deci-
sions resulting in custody was necessary to protect the constitutional 
rights of state prisoners and ensure that the state courts faithfully 
applied the Court’s constitutional precedents.248 
This section discusses two substantive limitations adopted by the 
Burger and Rehnquist Courts and their compatibility with the notion 
that state prisoners are entitled to plenary federal court review of 
constitutional issues decided against them by the state courts. The 
two limitations are the exclusion of Fourth Amendment exclusion-
ary rule claims from the scope of habeas review and the exclusion 
of “new” rules not falling into one of two exceptions. 
A. Stone v. Powell and Errors Relating to Fourth Amendment 
Exclusionary Rule 
In Stone v. Powell, the Court held that habeas relief would be 
unavailable for claimed errors by state courts in the application of 
the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, unless the state did not 
“provid[e] . . . an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth 
Amendment claim” in its courts.249 The Court thus adopted for ha-
beas claims of Fourth Amendment error the standard that Professor 
Bator had advocated for all claims of constitutional error250—a 
standard akin to that adopted in Williams v. Taylor for all claims 
adjudicated on the merits in state court.251 Stone thus appears to be 
an exception to proposition that, after Brown and before Williams, 
habeas was available for de novo federal review of constitutional 
issues decided by the state courts and resulting in custody.252 
On closer inspection, however, Stone is more a decision about 
the Exclusionary Rule than a decision about the scope of habeas cor-
pus jurisdiction. That is, at any rate, how the majority presented its 
holding. The Court stressed that prior decisions had “established that 
the [exclusionary] rule is not a personal constitutional right.”253 Ra-
ther, the exclusionary rule is “a judicially created remedy designed 
                                                                                                             
 248 See, e.g., Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 306–08 (1989). 
 249 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976). 
 250 See Bator, supra note 3, at 446. 
 251 See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 390–91 (2000).  
 252 See Stone, 428 U.S. at 494–96. 
 253 Id. at 486. 
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to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deter-
rent effect.”254 Given its prophylactic nature, the Court held, the rule 
should not be applicable in contexts in which its benefits are out-
weighed by its costs.255 As support for this view, the Court cited 
prior decisions limiting the rule’s applicability, such as the excep-
tion permitting the admission of evidence obtained in violation of 
the Fourth Amendment for purposes of impeachment256 and the 
rule’s “standing” limitation, permitting only the victim of the illegal 
search to invoke the exclusionary rule.257 The Court understood 
these decisions to establish a “balancing” test under which the ex-
clusionary remedy is available in a given context only if the rule’s 
costs are outweighed by its benefits as a deterrent to Fourth Amend-
ment violations.258 
To be sure, the majority’s application of the balancing test relied 
on certain assumptions about the reliability of state courts as enforc-
ers of federal rights that, as Justice Brennan noted in his dissent, 
appear to contradict basic assumptions underlying the Court’s ha-
beas jurisprudence.259 In a footnote, the majority noted its confi-
dence in the state courts’ ability and willingness to enforce federal 
rights faithfully: “Despite differences in institutional environment 
and the unsympathetic attitude to federal constitutional claims of 
some state judges in years past, we are unwilling to assume that there 
now exists a general lack of appropriate sensitivity to constitutional 
rights in the trial and appellate courts of the several States.”260 As 
Justice Brennan noted, this assumption flies in the face of prior state-
ments by the Court that “‘habeas serves as a necessary additional 
incentive for trial and appellate courts throughout the land to con-
duct their proceedings in a manner consistent with established con-
stitutional standards[,]’” and that “[t]he availability of collateral re-
                                                                                                             
 254 Id. (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 255 See id. at 494–95. 
 256 See id. at 485. 
 257 See id. at 488. 
 258 See id. at 489. 
 259 See id. at 509–10 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 260 Id. at 494 n.35. 
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view assures ‘that the lower federal and state courts toe the consti-
tutional line.’”261 Since the majority’s confidence in the lower courts 
extended to all “constitutional rights,” Justice Brennan feared that 
the Court’s holding portended a drastic narrowing of the availability 
of habeas review generally, or at least with respect to rules that, in 
the majority’s words, did not bear on the defendant’s guilt and hence 
on “the basic justice of [the prisoner’s] incarceration.”262 
In the end, the majority’s assumption about the reliability of 
state courts as enforcers of constitutional rights should not have led 
the Court to conclude that the costs of applying the exclusionary rule 
on habeas outweighed the benefits of doing so. The main cost of the 
exclusionary rule, according to the majority, was that it “often frees 
the guilty.”263 Against this cost, the majority weighed the “incre-
mental deterrent effect” of applying the rule on habeas.264 If the 
Court had compared the incremental costs of applying the rule on 
habeas with the incremental benefit of doing so, the Court would 
have found them to be congruent. This would be so whether or not 
one believed that the state courts were reliable enforcers of federal 
rights. If the state courts are not reliable enforcers of federal rights, 
then the federal courts would be freeing the guilty, but that would 
be because the state courts were failing to apply the exclusionary 
rule faithfully. On that assumption, application of the rule on habeas 
would be necessary as a deterrent. If the state courts are reliable en-
forcers of the exclusionary rule, then the federal courts on habeas 
would not be freeing the guilty—by hypothesis, the state courts 
would be doing so. Thus, the cost of applying the exclusionary rule 
on habeas that the Court identified would not be very high.265 
Thus, the Court’s cost-benefit analysis was structurally flawed 
and, in any event, did not really turn on the Court’s footnote assump-
tion that state courts are reliable enforcers of constitutional rights. 
                                                                                                             
 261 Id. at 520–21 (quoting Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 262–63 
(1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting)) (emphasis removed). 
 262 Id. at 492 n.31. 
 263 Id. at 490. 
 264 Id. at 494. 
 265 One might conclude that, if state courts are reliable enforcers of the exclu-
sionary rule, application of the exclusionary rule on federal habeas is costly from 
the standpoint of judicial efficiency, but that is not the sort of cost the Court 
seemed to be relying upon in its opinion. 
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The latter assumption might well have justified a broader narrowing 
of habeas, but the majority responded to Justice Brennan’s fear by 
describing it as a “hyperbole” and making clear that “[o]ur decision 
today is not concerned with the scope of the habeas statute as au-
thority for litigating constitutional claims generally.”266 Indeed, Jus-
tice Powell, the author of Stone, subsequently affirmed his view that 
“[r]eview on habeas to determine that the conviction rests upon cor-
rect application of the law in effect at the time of the conviction is . . . 
required to ‘forc[e] trial and appellate courts . . . to toe the constitu-
tional mark.’”267 
Instead, the majority in Stone made clear that its holding was 
based on the idea “that the exclusionary rule is a judicially created 
remedy rather than a personal constitutional right” and “the minimal 
utility of the rule when sought to be applied to Fourth Amendment 
claims in a habeas corpus proceeding.”268 Since, as noted, the rea-
soning that led the Court to the latter conclusion was fundamentally 
flawed, the most convincing explanation of the Court’s holding is 
that the Court did not regard the exclusionary rule as a constitutional 
right. So understood, Stone v. Powell is a modified application of 
the established principle, also noted by the majority, that habeas re-
lief is not available for claimed errors of non-constitutional federal 
law unless “the alleged error constituted ‘a fundamental defect 
which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice.’”269 If 
so, then Stone v. Powell is not in conflict with the proposition that 
state prisoners have a right to de novo review via habeas corpus of 
constitutional errors in their state court convictions. 
                                                                                                             
 266 Id. at 495 n.37. 
 267 Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638, 653 (1984) (Powell, J., concurring) (quot-
ing Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 687 (1971)). 
 268 Stone, 428 U.S. at 495 n.37. For a more recent articulation of this view, see 
Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 236–37 (2011) (“The Fourth Amendment 
. . . says nothing about suppressing evidence obtained in violation of [its] com-
mand. [The exclusionary rule] is a ‘prudential’ doctrine created by this Court to 
‘compel respect for the constitutional guaranty.’ Exclusion is ‘not a personal con-
stitutional right’. . . .” (citations omitted)). 
 269 Id. at 477 n.10 (quoting Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 346 (1974) 
(quoting Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428 (1962))) (internal quotation 
marks removed). It is a modified application of the principle insofar as it leaves 
open the possibility of federal habeas relief for exclusionary rule claims if the state 
did not provide an opportunity for full and fair litigation of the claim. See id. 
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B. Teague v. Lane and “New” Rules of Constitutional Law 
The Court adopted another substantive limit on the availability 
of habeas review in Teague v. Lane.270 Teague was framed as a hold-
ing regarding the retroactive applicability of Supreme Court deci-
sions recognizing “new” rules of constitutional law.271 At one time, 
the Court permitted the articulation of “new” rules of constitutional 
law by the lower courts on habeas review, and the new rule was al-
ways applied in the case in which it was articulated.272 The “retro-
activity” issue would be addressed in a subsequent case and would 
be decided according to a multi-factor test that did not turn on 
whether the later case was pending on direct review at the time of 
the rule’s articulation or subsequently commenced on collateral re-
view.273 In Griffith v. Kentucky, the Court held that new rules must 
be applied to all cases pending on direct review at the time the new 
rule was announced.274 “[T]he Court’s assertion of power to disre-
gard current law in adjudicating cases before us that have not already 
run the full course of appellate review,” the Court explained in Grif-
fith, “is quite simply an assertion that our constitutional function is 
not one of adjudication but in effect of legislation.”275 
Although Griffith’s reasoning seemed to deny the very concept 
of a “new” constitutional rule, in Teague the Court held that new 
constitutional rules should generally not be applied on collateral re-
view.276 In reaching this decision, the Court endorsed the view that 
“the threat of habeas serves as a necessary additional incentive for 
trial and appellate courts throughout the land to conduct their pro-
ceedings in a manner consistent with established constitutional 
                                                                                                             
 270 Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 316 (1989) (plurality opinion). 
 271 See id. at 316 (“We can simply refuse to announce a new rule in a given 
case unless the rule would be applied retroactively to the defendant in the case 
and to all other similarly situated . . . .We think this approach is a sound one.”). 
 272 See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 247, at 1741. 
 273 FALLON ET AL., supra note 49, at 1295–96. See also Fallon & Meltzer, su-
pra note 247, at 1743–46. 
 274 479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987). 
 275 Id. at 323 (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 679 (1971)). 
 276 See Teague, 489 U.S. at 316 (“We therefore hold that . . . habeas corpus 
cannot be used as a vehicle to create new constitutional rules of criminal proce-
dure unless those rules would be applied retroactively to all defendants on collat-
eral review . . . .”). 
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standards.”277 But, the Court wrote, “[i]n order to perform this de-
terrence function, . . . the habeas court need only apply the constitu-
tional standards that prevailed at the time the original proceedings 
took place.”278 For this reason, the Court held, “new” constitutional 
rules should ordinarily not be applicable on federal habeas re-
view.279 
The Court recognized two exceptions to this non-retroactivity 
rule.280 “First, a new rule should be applied retroactively if it places 
‘certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the 
power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe.’”281 The 
Court subsequently expanded this category “to cover not only rules 
forbidding criminal punishment of certain primary conduct, but also 
rules prohibiting a certain category of punishment for a class of de-
fendants because of their status or offense.”282 The second exception 
consists of constitutional decisions recognizing “new procedures 
without which the likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously 
diminished.”283 The Court in Teague thought it “unlikely that many 
such components of basic due process have yet to emerge,”284 and it 
has yet to find that a new constitutional rule falls in this category. 
New rules that fall in either category are applicable retroactively to 
prisoners seeking collateral review, but otherwise habeas relief is 
available only for claims that the state court violated an “old” rule—
i.e., one that had been articulated at the time his conviction became 
final.285 
                                                                                                             
 277 Id. at 306 (quoting Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 262–63 (1969) 
(Harlan, J., dissenting)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 278 Id. (quoting Desist, 394 U.S. at 263 (Harlan, J., dissenting)) (internal quo-
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 284 Id. 
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In principle at least, the Teague doctrine is consistent with the 
proposition that state prisoners are entitled to de novo review of their 
constitutional claims. Teague merely tells the habeas court what law 
they should apply in performing this de novo review. The state court 
proceeding is to be tested against the law in effect at the time of the 
state proceeding. Rules articulated by the Supreme Court after those 
proceedings are to be disregarded unless they fall within one of the 
two exceptions. If the purpose of habeas review is to provide state 
courts with an incentive to apply federal law faithfully, this rule 
makes some sense. After all, state trial and appellate judges cannot 
reasonably be expected to comply with constitutional principles not 
yet articulated.286 The Teague rule also produces, again in principle, 
a sensible division of authority as between the Supreme Court and 
the lower federal courts.287 Unless the claim falls within one of the 
two narrow exceptions the Court recognized, the role of the lower 
federal courts on habeas is to carry out the comparatively mundane 
task of ensuring state-court compliance with well-established con-
stitutional rules. The Supreme Court, in directly reviewing state 
court judgments of conviction, would retain the responsibility for 
resolving unsettled questions of federal constitutional law arising in 
state criminal cases. 
As applied, however, the Teague doctrine has been rightly criti-
cized as giving state courts an insufficient incentive to apply federal 
precedents faithfully.288 The problem has primarily been the Court’s 
very broad interpretation of the concept of “new” law.289 Moreover, 
the Court’s test for distinguishing old from new rules blurs the line 
between de novo and deferential review of state decisions. The 
Court determines whether a claimed rule would be new and hence 
inapplicable on habeas by asking whether a reasonable jurist exam-
ining the extant precedents would conclude that the claimed rule was 
already established. 
                                                                                                             
 286 See id. (quoting Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 534 (1953) (Jackson, J., 
concurring in result) (“[S]tate courts cannot ‘anticipate, and so comply with, this 
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 287 That is, compared to AEDPA as interpreted in Williams v. Taylor. See 
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In Wright v. West, Justice Thomas (writing for himself, Chief 
Justice Rehnquist, and Justice Scalia) argued that this test effectively 
requires the habeas court to defer to the state court’s interpretation 
of the then-existing precedents.290 Justice O’Connor (Teague’s au-
thor) disagreed: 
Teague did not establish a “deferential” standard of 
review of state court determinations of federal law. It 
did not establish a standard of review at all. Instead, 
Teague simply requires that a state conviction on fed-
eral habeas be judged according to the law in exist-
ence when the conviction became final. In Teague, 
we refused to give state prisoners the retroactive ben-
efit of new rules of law, but we did not create any 
deferential standard of review with regard to old 
rules.291 
Justice Kennedy agreed with Justice O’Connor: 
Teague did not establish a deferential standard of re-
view of state-court decisions of federal law. It estab-
lished instead a principle of retroactivity . . . .To be 
sure, the fact that our standard for distinguishing old 
rules from new ones turns on the reasonableness of a 
state court’s interpretation of then existing prece-
dents suggests that federal courts do in one sense de-
fer to state-court determinations. But we should not 
lose sight of the purpose of the reasonableness in-
quiry where a Teague issue is raised: The purpose is 
to determine whether application of a new rule would 
upset a conviction that was obtained in accordance 
                                                                                                             
 290 See Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 291 (1992) (“In other words, a federal 
habeas court ‘must defer to the state court’s decision rejecting the claim unless 
that decision is patently unreasonable.’” (quoting Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 
407, 422 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting))). 
 291 Id. at 303–304 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment) (internal citations 
removed). 
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with the constitutional interpretations existing at the 
time of the prisoner’s conviction.292 
In sum, Teague retained de novo habeas corpus review for “old” 
rules.293 
Although Justice Thomas lost the battle in Wright v. West, he 
may have won the war. Justices O’Connor and Kennedy made clear 
in Wright that Teague had not mandated deferential review of “old” 
constitutional claims on habeas.294 In Williams, however, these Jus-
tices joined Justice Thomas and two other Justices who had joined 
his opinion in concluding that Congress, in enacting AEDPA, had 
displaced de novo review of old claims that had been adjudicated on 
the merits in state court, imposing the deferential standard of review 
that Justice Thomas had mistakenly believed had been established 
by Teague.295 
The Court in Williams did not discuss whether the denial of ha-
beas relief for wrong but reasonable errors would affect its approach 
to certiorari petitions of persons convicted in state court who would 
no longer be able to obtain relief from the lower federal courts on 
habeas review.296 As this Article has shown, state prisoners had al-
ways had access to federal review of errors of federal constitutional 
law and of mixed questions from either the Supreme Court or the 
lower federal courts.297 Between 1916 and 1953, the responsibility 
for providing such review shifted from the Supreme Court to the 
lower federal courts as the Court came to realize that it could no 
longer hope to fulfill an error-correction role.298 Between 1953 and 
1996, the Court cut back on habeas relief in certain respects but 
maintained the de novo standard of review in habeas cases, believ-
ing that such review provided “a necessary additional incentive for 
                                                                                                             
 292 Id. at 307 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment). 
 293 See id. at 303–04 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment). See also Teague, 
489 U.S. at 316. 
 294 See id. at 303–04, 307. 
 295 See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 390–91 (2000).  
 296 See id. 
 297 See supra Parts I–II. 
 298 See supra Part II. 
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trial and appellate courts throughout the land to conduct their pro-
ceedings in a manner consistent with established constitutional 
standards.”299 
If the Court still believes that such an incentive is necessary, it 
may need to rethink its current approach to certiorari petitions by 
state prisoners whose access to the habeas relief has been curtailed 
by AEDPA, as the Court interpreted the statute in Williams.300 Just 
as habeas has always served a forum-allocation function, Williams 
may require the Court to understand AEDPA as a forum-allocation 
rule. The Court will need to consider whether Congress in enacting 
AEDPA meant, improbably, to reestablish the regime for reviewing 
state court criminal convictions that the Court emphatically rejected 
in 1953.301 
CONCLUSION 
The scope of federal habeas relief available to state prisoners in 
the years before Brown v. Allen was decided in 1953 is a famously 
disputed question—a question of recognized importance to current 
debates about the proper scope of habeas relief. This Article has 
shown that the available scope of habeas relief has always been di-
rectly linked to the effective availability of direct review of state 
criminal convictions in the Supreme Court. The need for federal re-
view of issues of constitutional law and the application of such law 
to facts decided against criminal defendants in the state courts has 
always been recognized. Only the forum affording such review has 
changed. Between 1789 and 1916, state criminal defendants were 
entitled to review of such issues in the U.S. Supreme Court. Between 
1953 and 1996, de novo review of such issues was available in the 
lower federal courts via habeas. The period between 1916 and 1953 
was a transitional period marked by disagreement among the Jus-
tices as to the proper federal forum for providing such review. At 
first, a majority of the Court continued to regard the Supreme Court 
as the proper forum for the sensitive task of reviewing and possibly 
reversing state court criminal judgments that had been affirmed by 
the highest state courts. Gradually, the Court came to recognize that 
                                                                                                             
 299 See supra Parts III (A)–(B). 
 300 See Williams, 529 U.S. at 390–91. 
 301 See generally Vázquez, AEDPA as Forum-Allocation Rule, supra note 34. 
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it could not hope to fulfill an error-correction function in such cases. 
The Court thus made clear in Brown v. Allen both that the Court’s 
denials of certiorari petitions filed by state prisoners should not be 
regarded as reflecting its views on the merits of the prisoner’s con-
stitutional claims and that the habeas courts should review de novo 
the issues of federal constitutional law and of application of such 
law to fact decided against the prisoner by the state courts. 
 
 
